Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-spop-10

Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> Tue, 10 March 2015 22:42 UTC

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Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 23:42:06 +0100
From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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To: Naveen Agarwal <naa@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-spop-10
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Thanks, Naveen!

I will complete my shepherd write-up with this information.

Ciao
Hannes

On 03/10/2015 07:33 PM, Naveen Agarwal wrote:
> 
>     I definitely need the IPR confirmation.
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not aware of any IPR related tho this draft.
> 
> 
> On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Hannes Tschofenig
> <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>> wrote:
> 
>     Hi Nat, John, Naveen,
> 
>     thanks a lot for your work on the document.
> 
>     I still need responses to this mail to complete the shepherd writeup:
>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg14100.html
> 
>     I definitely need the IPR confirmation.
> 
>     It would also be helpful to have someone who implemented the
>     specification as it currently is. I asked Brian and Thorsten for
>     clarification regarding their statements that they implemented earlier
>     versions of the spec.
> 
>     As a final remark I still believe that the text regarding the randomness
>     is still a bit inconsistent. Here are two examples:
> 
>     1) In the Security Consideration you write that "The security model
>     relies on the fact that the code verifier is not learned or guessed by
>     the attacker.  It is vitally important to adhere to this principle. "
> 
>     2) In Section 4.1 you, however, write: "NOTE: code verifier SHOULD have
>     enough entropy to make it impractical to guess the value.  It is
>     RECOMMENDED that the output of a suitable random number generator be
>     used to create a 32-octet sequence."
> 
>     There is clearly a long way from a SHOULD have enough entropy to the
>     text in the security consideration section where you ask for 32 bytes
>     entropy.
> 
>     It is also not clear why you ask for 32 bytes of entropy in particular.
> 
>     Ciao
>     Hannes
> 
>