Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Wed, 27 January 2016 17:03 UTC

Return-Path: <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD9891ACD87 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 09:03:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.378
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.378 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fWD6FkjGsQrD for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 09:03:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ig0-x231.google.com (mail-ig0-x231.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4001:c05::231]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 844321ACD97 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 09:03:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ig0-x231.google.com with SMTP id h5so15966986igh.0 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 09:03:10 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=pingidentity.com; s=gmail; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=DJeeo55Bf0ZN898cBCJEhqRuj00/AAseC0VCYcQ08cw=; b=ZFPyTprLj0kHLSI7Gnu+6YfbYIlNRkndJLxn1yov/AM32tmBz5K9aHrPwQrC8+6ITR zpm/xi2ZA9bYaxcisv9sv8ctLzHdBQP0nXkGEZIbnQXKz3E+FpFQeh4JIQxaFscqqcjc /X4V8iHtBII0uU7cBqC/9x+CJuaE963LXTKtc=
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; bh=DJeeo55Bf0ZN898cBCJEhqRuj00/AAseC0VCYcQ08cw=; b=hNZmN2dALoac3q18TTdIPmWi95MnmDcEf+Gb3aBVlhFQ4XLBUB19L+3+pTiggHu2A3 yLQ6obPaoSg0n1SnXdcLq31G3npzohqdxB9DZm5mx0VfXxEX3NegOY+7Bl3UEK/Kz0pP DHvY86unB7W+F9qUrQxaTw4vu5YCkbZtFNYyY5VJJRVEwqltvHoxs7Gvt40T4fGQzjnD LvGMjJbIs3k7U4woX/WqACwuCuXSjPABXatmOs+jglgtWq2Xw/tQp++xnfQ30j5OkcPE S6gZHLGHnJ+r6F3HMV+P/KKD9CmLh6MeAgDWStplwLhW7XuuBNO3oHOIGDsi0AxemLSW MeXA==
X-Gm-Message-State: AG10YORCXEWXMfF5nlSUQNxnyQD2ZCMx7y9c70OGyqArWvOf3ot10rgF0YB4SqAMQFfG2Ot1fwVDWNlqjqcL9xPt
X-Received: by 10.50.18.112 with SMTP id v16mr29494675igd.57.1453914189858; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 09:03:09 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.64.212.69 with HTTP; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 09:02:40 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <E63EF38B-8A63-4490-8A07-56CD2A3B7E4B@ve7jtb.com>
References: <569E2076.2090405@gmx.net> <CABzCy2DehwZh2gd_6oNy69O+qxowva00qZWnX8uWX2n4h+kPLw@mail.gmail.com> <BY2PR03MB442EA7CE4F9728C2E39BBEAF5C30@BY2PR03MB442.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <EE414329-AA2A-4F99-841B-0581E4F4605F@mit.edu> <CABzCy2A9RCONixTG+ZFD8sz6FTD-o1Do8iV2gX2=pKu+PenT-A@mail.gmail.com> <BY2PR03MB442DE057967872C63A56DF8F5C40@BY2PR03MB442.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <CABzCy2Co2okoC_hxy3bLTzbGm3nuQiULM3XqkJMwiV_5iU9-=Q@mail.gmail.com> <CA+k3eCSfXQng6PzhWR-Qjyp=SO1LYnfXH7qqzb-5btqWaJJX-A@mail.gmail.com> <BY2PR03MB4422882B74ED659DB47CECDF5C40@BY2PR03MB442.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <CABzCy2CC8jN6kzxbJ70m900g4J1VW2b65gM_M1dhx6YXfWVhdQ@mail.gmail.com> <CA+k3eCSiEcE-YRG+ej+zJuEHOwqO4oyvvGmKWv5SeMUu4dVPrA@mail.gmail.com> <56A78EEF.4090706@aol.com> <CA+k3eCQh+KfX8+NONECjVj2ZX_e=JFFM4fF7XXcxwWJ-kii9Tw@mail.gmail.com> <56A7C3E8.8080601@aol.com> <CA+k3eCREJUx4Mb_aciKJoq03j0tdmwB2LEPw7GvZA1ZOBNhq+w@mail.gmail.com> <CABzCy2C69JAadYfaZNXgfMaAiJJOuXoKGkC3vC+x8KnhXPHpKw@mail.gmail.com> <56A8794C.2040304@pingidentity.com> <c8c693abce3e7f013d3af38f3b9333fb@gmail.com> <E63EF38B-8A63-4490-8A07-56CD2A3B7E4B@ve7jtb.com>
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 10:02:40 -0700
Message-ID: <CA+k3eCT4VneEPSgBX0Ydf=QwUcpHN-2w7rsmQ3gOCs1T44vjvQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0149bd92d23529052a53c663
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/iIigFrXl7Bxk8UZJygw9VadlKT0>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 17:03:13 -0000

There's at least one smallish deployment that has a different authority for
the Authorization Endpoint and the Token Endpoint.

from https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration :

{
 "issuer": "https://accounts.google.com",
 "authorization_endpoint": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth",
 "token_endpoint": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v4/token",
 "userinfo_endpoint": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/userinfo",
 "revocation_endpoint": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revoke",
 "jwks_uri": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs",
 ...
}



On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 6:30 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>; wrote:

> It think requiring a common authority segment for the authorization
> endpoint and the token endpoint might work in common cases, but there are
> legitimate cases where the URI of the Authorization endpoint might be a
> alias in the case of multi tenants, all using a common token endpoint.
>
> The larger problem would be the RS, it is not uncommon to have the AS and
> RS in different domains,  so with bearer tokens unless you make the same
> authority restriction for RS then you are not really stoping the attacker.
>  They can get the AT by impersonating the RS.
>
> I think trying to enforce a common origin policy over OAuth would be a bad
> direction to go.
>
> I understand that it seems like a easy fix on the surface, and it works
> for most of the things people are using OAuth for today, but would be quite
> limiting over the long term.
>
> John B.
> > On Jan 27, 2016, at 7:31 AM, sakimura@gmail.com wrote:
> >
> > Hi Hans,
> >
> > Sorry, I mixed up the IdP mix-up attack and the code phishing attack.
> >
> > Mandating the Authorization and Token Endpoint being in the same
> > authority would solve the later without changing the wire protocol.
> >
> > For AS mix-up attack, mandating the client to change the redirection
> endpoint
> > per AS would solve the problem without change the wire protocol.
> >
> > If these are not possible, then we would have to look at changing the
> > wire protocol. The solution that solves the both cases must
> > provide the token endpoint URI authoritatively, which means
> > you have to mandate some variation of discovery mandatory.
> >
> > Nat
> >
> >
> > At 2016-01-27 17:01  Hans Zandbelt wrote:
> >> I don't see how that can deal with the specific form of the attack
> >> where the Client would have sent the authorization request to the
> >> legitimate authorization endpoint of a compromised AS and believes it
> >> gets the response from that, where in fact it was redirected away to
> >> the good AS.
> >> IOW, I don't think this is so much about mixing up endpoints where to
> >> send stuff to, but mixing up the entity/endpoint from which the Client
> >> believes the response was received. That may just be terminology
> >> though.
> >> Bottom line as far as I see is that a wire protocol element in the
> >> response is needed to tell the Client who issued it, regardless of how
> >> the Client deals with configuration of the AS information.
> >> Hans.
> >> On 1/27/16 1:31 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
> >>> So, is there a lot of cases that the authority section of the Good AS's
> >>> Authorization Endpoint and the Token Endpoints are different?
> >>> If not, then requiring that they are the same seems to virtually remove
> >>> the attack surface for the mix-up related attacks. It does not
> introduce
> >>> new parameter nor discovery. If it can be done, it probably is not
> worth
> >>> adding a new wire protocol element to mitigate the mix-up variants.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>