Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce
Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 18 March 2021 11:33 UTC
Return-Path: <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2840E3A28B0; Thu, 18 Mar 2021 04:33:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.097
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.097 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qEQspmJlkACp; Thu, 18 Mar 2021 04:33:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lj1-x232.google.com (mail-lj1-x232.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::232]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 124E53A28AB; Thu, 18 Mar 2021 04:33:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lj1-x232.google.com with SMTP id u4so7041416ljo.6; Thu, 18 Mar 2021 04:33:40 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=95lrzEvrJRhZzEFzUIS6VbwHsw36ECmLTW8S82RFENA=; b=RSZeB6U9XQTueIiHwsuJK7/SI+FDW61jrTvQCcC78l+EfocJ6F5eOiuKzxqKLFlscI hC0rWgI9JBIhhpu8X0lEQWPvScp5+xsOwDeBkJqVAMvkda5dLCbEoa2nCTbB/nPhoRqu sa173O8XXNabkiIhXYufGuEDynhK2jkYmlhxQPGN69QcnY7UjaFwFrIzB33c0qVTAcZI odC50rMVBzWNE8kwZEZ/jbG/R+EBooa457JcMSKvkiCjDQCCR0BVfvTMRNkdysKNpeSF kbIPM73R6u0cRbRCW+TDJt8Yn0qBgUin69rwV5RY5LygkvY7EsNcr6Lntu/xEFyW8lUP UHKA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=95lrzEvrJRhZzEFzUIS6VbwHsw36ECmLTW8S82RFENA=; b=npYmGNL+yR5q/reikT4JUCUv4tJ5Rk6ansYqUxdUYqwBpBbWhEkFLLEClAotrNjUM8 R7odT4ReWJO7C7IALSuzOMvKBR2sqBc7q3TcrqgBJzbYOe3xB1RC3VV/Dv3h78ZAGzc4 Jon3jVCaogiIucw4MFGK2RtWIq+Z63oXBth0ugUv/w8+A6p9um/DDI3LHqMF09/I2+Aq uManKmywSsrmef79+IvuEseHeoVEevk8km7Z1gbEqQIrPpw6T/g0vxHUhrz+4Gxzq/X2 XiuPk3LaRwp53EuYfQPVypMyVNPUr4C3uZwL12oT9tV62bAQkZiM/rWzg8+LkO2ISqMP HzYg==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531nGHpUCMeDLA2+OVirn19ISPj61XBE0svnZMIlEES5ykOWmhLu 95DnvaGQPvVOkS95+zxdo+QQABf/2LiqeWkC46s=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx+1v32uiJNsFSDjxMALLxMrOFZwY0d7mDI3T74WwQNrjreQMmZazqeafuS8DO0cu6KG1dYZmwixXb6pSruhuk=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b537:: with SMTP id z23mr4935594ljm.350.1616067219013; Thu, 18 Mar 2021 04:33:39 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CALkShcttq5WKzJ4Zp8396hd+Dnoa6x74s0ekBGGNddWhoNqJ=g@mail.gmail.com> <D4516625-A215-4864-A893-16975A1E901D@forgerock.com>
In-Reply-To: <D4516625-A215-4864-A893-16975A1E901D@forgerock.com>
From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2021 07:33:27 -0400
Message-ID: <CADNypP9FTQ1-vtzuQbHakOUKwQd0gHZhOpWakUG2EWqECDxnow@mail.gmail.com>
To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
Cc: Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000085c62005bdcdf864"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/iSzDM5vGwAnhW1B1OP6W3HdAnpY>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2021 11:33:45 -0000
On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 3:45 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> wrote: > > > On 18 Mar 2021, at 05:33, Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com> wrote: > > > The Cache-Control header, even with its strongest directive "no-store", is > pretty naive protection... Below is an excerpt from RFC 7234 (Hypertext > Transfer Protocol: Caching). > > This directive is NOT a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring >> privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not >> recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be >> vulnerable to eavesdropping. > > > This quote is about privacy. Your concerns so far have been about replay > protection. TLS protects both. > > > Regarding TLS, I've mentioned that we don't always have the luxury to see > what is going on with the infrastructure. A bright example would be an AS > implemented as a serverless application and hosted by one of the cloud > providers. > > > Right, but (as I’ve said before) the same reasoning applies to a JWT too. > The infrastructure could just as easily “terminate JWS” as it currently > terminates TLS. As I keep saying, it’s much better to spend your time > ensuring end-to-end TLS than end-to-end JWT. > That's not always possible. In some enterprises, they will have an inspection middlebox that breaks the end-to-end TLS, e.g., ZScaler. Regards, Rifaat > We should try to avoid writing specs just to work around badly configured > infrastructure. > > (The counterexample to this is IoT applications, where messages often have > to traverse protocol-translating proxies. But that’s not the case here). > > > As for, > > Right - so trying to solve this issue by replacing TLS with another >> technology that is just as susceptible to the problem is not a real >> solution. > > > Following your logic, other RFCs such as 8555 (Automatic Certificate > Management Environment) went the wrong way with their mandatory anti-replay > built-in mechanism in quite similar circumstances. > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.5 > > > The only justification of the replay nonce given in RFC8555 is for > protection of 0RTT early-data (which does not benefit from TLS’s normal > replay protections). As to why a protocol that can typically tolerate > latencies of several weeks (for cert renewal) needs 0RTT, you’ll have to > ask the authors of that RFC. It makes little sense to me. > > — Neil > > > ForgeRock values your Privacy <https://www.forgerock.com/your-privacy> > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
- [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspec… Andrii Deinega
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Andrii Deinega
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Andrii Deinega
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Andrii Deinega
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Andrii Deinega
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Warren Parad
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Intro… Rifaat Shekh-Yusef