[OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability

Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> Tue, 17 December 2024 01:26 UTC

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From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 17:25:51 -0800
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To: Pierce Gorman <Pierce.Gorman@numeracle.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability
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I could have been more clear. If a verifier is asking for information, it
must include strong human-centric ID of verifier, data retention and
purpose.  That is not currently possible with the VP. This makes the OID4VP
an unethical means to request information. See the following:

https://www.acm.org/code-of-ethics
Only the minimum amount of personal information necessary should be
collected in a system. The retention and disposal periods for that
information should be clearly defined, enforced, and communicated to data
subjects. Personal information gathered for a specific purpose should not
be used for other purposes without the person's consent.

Clearly information holders can do what they want with their own data.

Peace ..tom jones


On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 11:22 AM Pierce Gorman <Pierce.Gorman@numeracle.com>
wrote:

> I think I disagree.  I assume an SD-JWT in a VP could be volunteered by a
> Holder initiating a transaction.  i.e., the relying party Verifier didn’t
> request the VP.
>
>
>
> The example I would give is an enterprise making a phone call and using
> SIP INVITE method Identity header to carry an SD-JWT VP.
>
>
>
> In the US, the TRACED Act law and several FCC mandates require voice calls
> in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to be authenticated using
> information contained in a JWT.
>
>
>
> The basic type of JWT required is defined in RFC 8225 “PASSporT: Personal
> Assertion Token” and is carried in the SIP INVITE method Identity header.
>
>
>
> There is also an I-D in the IETF STIR working group which proposes use of
> an SD-JWT: Verified STI Persona (aka VESPER).
>
>
>
> I assume the VP could be encoded by value in the SIP Identity JWT or could
> be passed via a DID document reference (in theory).
>
>
>
> Pierce
>
>
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> *From:* Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 16, 2024 12:50 PM
> *To:* Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability
>
>
>
> You don't often get email from thomasclinganjones@gmail.com. Learn why
> this is important <https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>
>
>
> *EXTERNAL EMAIL*
>
> The entire premise of SD-JWT in a VP transaction is basically fraudulent
> as there is not sufficient information in the VP to allow the user to make
> an informed consent decision. It gives the illusion of user control without
> the ability to deliver on the promise. For this proposal to have any value
> to the user it must be part of a transaction that tells the user agent
> (wallet) who is asking for the data and what the purpose of the request is.
> Absent that, this give the impression of user control of release of data
> without the fact.
>
>
>
> BTW - the idea of dealing with the UX of the transaction is admirable, but
> there are no UX people involved in the discussion.
>
>
>
> Peace ..tom jones
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 5:01 PM Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Dear all,
>
> I'd like to propose the following edit to resolve the concerns I have
> around endorsing dangerous applications of SD-JWT:
>
> Delete last two lines of
> https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt/pull/451/files
> in 1338 and 1339
>
> Add new paragraph right before the end of the section.
>
> "When disclosures include information easily understood to be
> identifying, users intuitive view of what they are revealing largely
> matches the underlying technical reality. In cases where the
> information being disclosed is not identifying, SD-JWT
> MUST NOT be used as this confusion leads to users making the wrong
> choices. Applications cannot assume Verifiers behave properly (RFC
> 3514) and MUST analyze the consequences for such linkage with each
> credential that could be used."
>
> I think this agrees with many of the comments made about my initially
> stronger edit, while addressing the core danger.
>
> Also, it seems this section only really treats issuer/verifier despite
> promising more. Do we need to rework it?
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> --
> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>
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