Re: [OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1

[Vittorio Bertocci <[e-mail]>]

Hey guys,
thanks for putting this together.
I am concerned with the real world impact of imposing sender constraint |
rotation as a MUST on refresh tokens in every scenario.
Sender constraint isn't immediately actionable - we just had the discussion
for dPOP, hence I won't go in the details here.
Rotation isn't something that can be added without significant impact on
development and runtime experiences:

   - on distributed scenarios, it introduces the need to serialize access
   to shared caches
   - network failures can lead to impact on experience- stranding clients
   which fail to receive RTn+1 during RTn redemption in a limbo where user
   interaction might become necessary, disrupting experience or functionality
   for scenarios where the user isn't available to respond.
   -



On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 5:28 PM Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:

> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first
> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on
> the list and incorporated that into the draft.
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01
>
> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be
> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below.
>
> > This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749),
> > OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange
> > (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
> > (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current
> > Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage
> > (RFC6750).
> >
> >   Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the
> >   original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with
> >   the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed
> >   entirely.
> >
> >   A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below:
> >
> >   *  The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality
> >      from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the
> >      authorization code grant according to this specification requires
> >      the addition of the PKCE mechanism
> >
> >   *  Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per
> >      Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >
> >   *  The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this
> >      specification as per Section 2.1.2 of
> >      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >
> >   *  The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this
> >      specification as per Section 2.4 of
> >      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >
> >   *  Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query
> >      string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of
> >      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >
> >   *  Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use
> >      as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12
>
> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a
> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that
> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future
> discussions!
>
> ----
> Aaron Parecki
> aaronparecki.com
> @aaronpk
>
> P.S. This notice was also posted at
> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1
>
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