Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR: pushed requests must become JWTs

Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> Fri, 10 January 2020 20:56 UTC

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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 15:55:55 -0500
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Cc: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Nat Sakimura <nat@sakimura.org>
To: "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR: pushed requests must become JWTs
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So we could solve this by saying the resulting data object of a PAR is a request object. Which might also contain a request object internally as well. In that case JAR should back off from saying it’s a JWT and instead say it’s a request object. Or we define a new term for this authorization request blob thing.

Or PAR could at least say that if it’s dereferenced over a remote protocol then it MUST be a JWT, but otherwise it can be whatever you want. That’s where the real interop concerns come in.

 — Justin

> On Jan 10, 2020, at 3:41 PM, Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> Correct. The problem becomes pretty clear in the context of PAR, where the AS is generating and vending out the URI at the PAR endpoint, and consuming it at the authorization endpoint. From an interoperability standpoint, it’s analogous to the AS vending an authorization code at the authorization endpoint and consuming it at the token endpoint.
> – 
> Annabelle Richard Backman
> AWS Identity
>  
>  
> From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> Date: Friday, January 10, 2020 at 12:29 PM
> To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>et>, Nat Sakimura <nat@sakimura.org>rg>, "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna@amazon.com>om>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [OAUTH-WG] PAR: pushed requests must become JWTs
>  
> If we assume the client posts a JAR and gets back a reference.  Then the reference is to a JAR. 
>  
> I think I see the problem.  If the server providing the reference is associated with the AS then the server dosen't need to dereference the object via HTTP, so it could be a URN as an example. 
>  
> So yes it is not a interoperability issue for the client.  
>  
> I will think about how I can finesse that. 
>  
> I agree it is not a change in intent. 
>  
> I will see if I can get our AD to accept that.
>  
> John B. 
>  
>  
>  
>  
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020, 4:57 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> wrote:
>> Sure but the text proposed (or something like it) qualifies it such that there aren't interoperability questions because it's only an implementation detail to the AS who both produces the URI and consumes its content.
>>  
>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 12:48 PM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com <mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>> wrote:
>>> It may be a challenge to change text saying that the contents of the resource could be something other than a request object. 
>>>  
>>> If not a request object then what and how is that interoperable are likely AD questions. 
>>>  
>>> I could perhaps see changing it to must be a request object, or other format defined by a profile.
>>> 
>>> John B.  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020, 3:45 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> wrote:
>>>> Agree and agree. But given that the change suggested by Annabelle has no impact on the client or interoperability, perhaps Nat or John could work the change into the draft during the edits that happen during the final stages of things?
>>>>  
>>>> On Thu, Jan 9, 2020 at 1:56 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>>>>> I would assume given the status of JAR, we don’t want to change it. And as I said, this difference does not impact interoperability from client perspective.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Am 09.01.2020 um 00:58 schrieb Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> It would be more appropriate to add the text to JAR rather than PAR. It doesn't seem right for PAR to retcon rules in JAR. Moving the text to JAR also highlights the weirdness of giving PAR special treatment.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> What if we changed this sentence in Section 5.2 of JAR:
>>>>>> The contents of the resource referenced by the URI MUST be a Request
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Object.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> To: 
>>>>>> The contents of the resource referenced by the URI MUST be a Request
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Object, unless the URI was provided to the client by the Authorization
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Server.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> This would allow for use cases such as an AS that provides pre-defined request URIs, or vends request URIs via a client management console, or bakes them into their client apps.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> – 
>>>>>> Annabelle Richard Backman
>>>>>> AWS Identity
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> On 1/8/20, 2:50 PM, "Torsten Lodderstedt" <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>     Hi, 
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     you are right, PAR does not require the AS to represent the request as a JWT-based request object. The URI is used as internal reference only. That why the draft states
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     "There is no need to make the
>>>>>>           authorization request data available to other parties via this
>>>>>>           URI.”
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     This difference matters from an AS implementation perspective, it doesn't matter from a client's (interop) perspective.
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     We may add a statement to PAR saying that request_uris issued by the PAR mechanism (MAY) deviate from the JAR definition.
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     best regards,
>>>>>>     Torsten.  
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     > On 8. Jan 2020, at 23:42, Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>>>>>>     > 
>>>>>>     > Hi all,
>>>>>>     >  
>>>>>>     > The current drafts of PAR (-00) and JAR (-20) require that the AS transform all pushed requests into JWTs. This requirement arises from the following:
>>>>>>     >         • PAR uses the request_uri parameter defined in JAR to communicate the pushed request to the authorization endpoint.
>>>>>>     >         • According to JAR, the resource referenced by request_uri MUST be a Request Object. (Section 5.2)
>>>>>>     >         • Request Object is defined to be a JWT containing all the authorization request parameters. (Section 2.1)
>>>>>>     >  
>>>>>>     > There is no need for this requirement to support interoperability, as this is internal to the AS. It is also inconsistent with the rest of JAR, which avoids attempting to define the internal communications between the two AS endpoints. Worse, this restriction makes it harder for the authorization endpoint to leverage validation and other work performed at the PAR endpoint, as the state or outcome of that work must be forced into the JWT format (or retrieved via a subsequent service call or database lookup).
>>>>>>     >  
>>>>>>     > – 
>>>>>>     > Annabelle Richard Backman
>>>>>>     > AWS Identity
>>>>>>     >  
>>>>>>     > _______________________________________________
>>>>>>     > OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>     > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>>>     > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     
>>>>> 
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