Re: [OAUTH-WG] Native clients & 'confidentiality'

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Mon, 19 December 2011 17:55 UTC

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Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 09:55:19 -0800
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mitre.org>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Native clients & 'confidentiality'
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On 12/19/2011 09:44 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
> Native mobile clients can't really be confidential clients.
>
> The distinction between "public" and "confidential" clients is whether 
> or not they can keep deployment-time secrets; which is to say, a 
> client_secret. This is not to say that they can't keep *any* secrets. 
> In particular those generated at runtime, like an access token or 
> refresh token, could be held perfectly safe. But at the time the app 
> is deployed to its running environment, you have to ask "who has 
> access to its code and configuration?"

Ah, thank you. The draft could be a *lot* more explicit about that in its
definitions. After reading it several times, I couldn't figure out who 
"public"
was to whom.

> Native apps also have the concern of embedded browsers vs. external 
> native browsers, and what trust the user puts into them. For all OAuth 
> flows, you have to trust the browser provider on the platform of 
> choice, since the user's going to be logging in directly through that 
> browser. It's very much outside the scope of OAuth to make that world 
> any better though, and there have been long and detailed discussions 
> on this list about that very topic, leading to some concrete 
> recommendations in the draft as it stands today.

As far as I can tell, the recommendations don't work.

Mike