[OAUTH-WG] Review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture

Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> Fri, 10 July 2015 20:48 UTC

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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: oauth@ietf.org
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 16:48:42 -0400
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture
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Hi,

In performing my shephard review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture I
found one issue that was bugging me: you talk about target naming "too
late" in the draft.  I.e., as I was reading through section 3.1 about
token reuse I think it doesn't have enough detail about how you would
prevent server A asking the client for a token for a resource of server
B, and then server A acting as the client for server B?  I.e., how do
you prevent server A acting as a MITM between the client and server B?
(This is sort of the same question that resulted in TLS channel
bindings).

I know this target (scope) protection exists, and it's even discussed a
bit later in the document but it's not even mentioned as a possible
threat in 3.1, which seems like a glaring ommission.

I'll create a more formal shephard review but I'd suggest some
additional text to at least mention this threat in 3.1; you can provide
a pointer to the protections then, too.

-derek
-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant