Re: [OAUTH-WG] Quick survey: fragment vs. query

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Thu, 12 August 2010 16:25 UTC

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Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2010 09:25:37 -0700
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Oleg Gryb <oleg@gryb.info>
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Cc: Naitik Shah <naitik@facebook.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Quick survey: fragment vs. query
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Hi Oleg -

"There are two kinds of information here: thirdparty.com state (e.g. list of
selected photos on Facebook) and access token, which is really a
printing.com
secret. If you store access token in a printing.com cookie you don't need to
share it with thirdparty.com."

The goal of the flow is for third-party.com to access printing.com.  That is
what the user wants to have happen, and the service provider wants to allow
it.

Cheers,
Brian

On Thu, Aug 12, 2010 at 8:26 AM, Oleg Gryb <oleg_gryb@yahoo.com> wrote:

>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> > From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
> > To: Oleg Gryb <oleg@gryb.info>
> > Cc: Naitik Shah <naitik@facebook.com>; OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
> > Sent: Wed, August 11, 2010 11:03:12 AM
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Quick survey: fragment vs. query
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 10, 2010 at 11:00 AM, Oleg Gryb <oleg_gryb@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > The  thing is that each time when a web app with sensitive info can be
> run
> in
> > >  a frame, security people would advice to break that
> > >  frame-reads-other-frame-data logic, because it can lead to violation
> of
> >same
> > > origin policy.
> >
> > This is incorrect.  The security of this  flow is based entirely on the
> > same-origin policy.
>
> It is not: you get an access token from authz server and want to share it
> with
> thirdparty.com domain, which is in a different domain. You do it through
> frames
> running in a browser. Do a threat modeling as others suggested here. Why
> the
> access token needs to be shared with thirdparty.com is still not clear.
>
> > Note  that both the web-server and the user-agent flows are entirely
> > about passing  information to third-party web sites, so suggesting that
> > these flows should  not pass information across domains is not really
> > helpful. =)
>
> There are two kinds of information here: thirdparty.com state (e.g. list
> of
> selected photos on Facebook) and access token, which is really a
> printing.com
> secret. If you store access token in a printing.com cookie you don't need
> to
> share it with thirdparty.com.
>
> > >  Yes, but you'll need a web server client for that. I'm saying that UA
> >profile  can
> > > be POST based too.
> >
> > (a) The POST would bust the browser  cache.
> > (b) Javascript can't read POST bodies.  (At least not to my  knowledge.
>
> No, it can't and I never said it could. Busting the browser cache by
> writing a
> server side logic doesn't look like a big issue or performance lost to me.
> You
> could aqcwire access token once, persist it (e.g. through a cookie in
> printing.com domain) and reuse until it's expired.
>
> > If we were willing to accept the performance penalty of  busting the
> > browser-cache, we would use the web-server  flow.
>
> I'm still struggling to undertand what you're trying to achieve with UA
> profile.
> If it's getting rid of web server client, you didn't aachieve it, because
> you
> still have thridparty.com, which is actually a web server client.
>
> Here are some qs to the existing spec (v.10) related to that:
>
>   "The user-agent profile is suitable for client applications residing
>   in a user-agent, typically implemented in a browser using a scripting
>   language such as JavaScript"Client application (JavaScript) resides and
> is
> implemented on thrirdparty.com. Browser only executes it, so you actually
> do
> have a web server client, it just you don't want to use server side code
> and
> server side objects, right? If this is the case, why don't you say it
> explicitly?
>
>
> "These clients cannot keep client
>   secrets confidential"What is wrong with cookies?
>
> I think, in your UA flow you'll also need to reflect:
>
> 1. thirdparty.com and it's role.
> 2. the cross-domain secret sharing logic that we've discussed here and why
> you
> need it.
>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing  list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>
>
>
>