Re: [OAUTH-WG] HTTP signing spec and nonce

Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> Mon, 29 February 2016 07:42 UTC

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Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 08:42:28 +0100
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From: Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>
To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] HTTP signing spec and nonce
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To me it seems reasonable that a client may send multiple signed messages
in one second.

So I´m +1 for a nonce. A more fine grained timestamp is nice but I think we
might end upp at the same place, someone saying that they think it is
reasonable to send multiple signed messages the same millisecond.

//Samuel

On Sun, Feb 28, 2016 at 10:34 PM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> I understand how they work, I’ve built exactly that cache before. But I
> askWouldn’t a unique timestamp have the same effect? Currently it’s integer
> seconds but slicing that down further (floating point seconds?) if people
> desired would allow for multiple signed messages in the same second from
> the same client using the otherwise same parameters.
>
> “Other protocols do it” is not a compelling reason on its own, especially
> when the example of “other protocols” includes WS-* ;)
>
> Seriously though, an optional nonce is easy to add to the draft if there’s
> enough WG support, I’m just hesitant to add more complexity than needed to
> this.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 26, 2016, at 11:06 PM, Dominick Baier <dbaier@leastprivilege.com>
> wrote:
>
> The nonce would allow to build a replay cache, the timestamp to trim that
> cache and reject messages that are too old.
>
> Similar protocols have a nonce for the above reasons (ws-sec msg security,
> hawk)...
>
> —
> cheers
> Dominick Baier
>
> On 27 February 2016 at 03:48:00, Justin Richer (jricher@mit.edu) wrote:
>
> I’d be glad to add in a nonce if there’s a compelling reason for it, such
> as closing a security attack vector.
>
> What’s the proposed purpose of the nonce? Is it just to add randomness to
> the signing base? Or is it to prevent replay at the RS? If the former, the
> timestamp should add enough of that and it can be verified to be within a
> reasonable window by the RS by comparing it with the time the request was
> made. If the latter, the RS is going to have to track previously used
> nonces for some amount of time.
>
> There was a small discussion of just signing an outgoing “Date:” header
> instead of the separate timestamp, but the timestamp seemed to be more
> robust. I forget the full reasoning though.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 26, 2016, at 9:49 AM, Brock Allen <brockallen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Question about the HTTP signing spec – why is there no nonce (and just a
> timestamp)?
>
> TIA
>
> -Brock
>
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