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Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-parecki-oauth-browser-based-apps-00

Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> Mon, 19 November 2018 10:33 UTC

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From: Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>
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Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 16:18:25 +0545
Cc: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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To: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-parecki-oauth-browser-based-apps-00
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I want to +1 this as well. This really got my attention as an impressive and straightforward defense technique.

Jim


> On Nov 19, 2018, at 3:48 PM, Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu> wrote:
> 
> +1 to the suggestions that Vladimir raises; I've seen a fair number of requests  in the field for exactly that
> 
> Hans.
> 
>> On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 10:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote:
>>> On 17/11/2018 13:26, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
>>> To start with, the AS may use refresh token rotation in combination with automatic revocation in case of detected replay attempts. 
>>> 
>>> How does it work? The AS issues a new refresh token with every refresh and invalidate the old one. This restricts the lifetime of a refresh token. If someone (might be the legit client or an attacker) submits one of the older, invalidated refresh token, the AS might interpret this as a signal indicating token leakage and revoke the valid refresh token as well. We used this technique at Deutsche Telekom since our first OAuth 2.0 implementation back in 2012.
>> This is a clever solution. Did you experience any false positives, e.g. due to HTTP response timeouts on slow / poor connections?
>> 
>> We were also thinking of additionally binding the refresh token to the end-user session at the AS / OP:
>> 
>> A valid refresh causing the session to be refreshed too
>> AS / OP logout or session expiration invalidating the refresh token
>> 
>> 
>> Vladimir
>> 
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 
> 
> -- 
> hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu
> ZmartZone IAM - www.zmartzone.eu
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