Re: [OAUTH-WG] Security of user agent clients (WAS: End user auth response code-and-token's scope parameter)

Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott@gmail.com> Sat, 03 July 2010 19:12 UTC

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Date: Sat, 03 Jul 2010 12:12:29 -0700
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From: Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott@gmail.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Security of user agent clients (WAS: End user auth response code-and-token's scope parameter)
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On Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote:

> You are putting too much weight on the value of redirection URI
> registration. Since the same problem exists between the user-agent script
> and the server-side component used in the user-agent profile, anyone can
> imitate that flow. In most cases, the redirection URI will simply include a
> script that will pass the parameter to the **parent** window which can be
> anything. If the server-based page is an active page, it still needs to
> communicate with the user-agent, which again, can pretend to be that.
>
Good point.  I wasn't imagining that far through it.  Not to deny that most
redirection URLs may just return a straight script that passes it to the
parent window, but that seems pretty irresponsible to the host that's doing
it -- because of the enormous security hole it opens up.  Some client is
trusted enough to authorize (by the user and auth server), receives an
access token it wasn't expecting, and then blindly forwards it onto whoever
wants it.  Yikes.  I sure hope these access tokens have *very* limited scope
(like, I'd prefer none myself).

I was about to describe how an active server could alleviate that by signing
the original request using the state parameter, but I realized I'm solving a
problem that the web server flow (or nowadays that the authorization code
mode as I guess it's called) already solves.  So I guess I just need to bite
the bullet and accept that the user agent flow is *totally *insecure for web
clients, and thus very special care must be taken to enable native clients
without opening up the web client hole.

Sorry to sound so negative about it.  Enabling this scenario seems really
important to me as well -- I just am against doing it when it can't be
secured in some way.  Seriously... as is, once you authorize any client,
you've authorized them all, including clients not even running on your
computer.  I guess this answers how I was visiting a site a few days ago and
was amazed that it knew who I was (via Facebook) and was displaying my name
and photo when I never logged into the site.  I was shocked it knew who I
was.  Enter living in Incognito mode from now on.