Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture
Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> Fri, 20 November 2015 17:02 UTC
Return-Path: <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C15861B2C3D for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 20 Nov 2015 09:02:00 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.786
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.786 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.585, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6WVR8hAh5kIq for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 20 Nov 2015 09:01:59 -0800 (PST)
Received: from aserp1040.oracle.com (aserp1040.oracle.com [141.146.126.69]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D3B7C1B2C2B for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 20 Nov 2015 09:01:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from aserv0021.oracle.com (aserv0021.oracle.com [141.146.126.233]) by aserp1040.oracle.com (Sentrion-MTA-4.3.2/Sentrion-MTA-4.3.2) with ESMTP id tAKH1v8S028193 (version=TLSv1 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 20 Nov 2015 17:01:57 GMT
Received: from aserv0121.oracle.com (aserv0121.oracle.com [141.146.126.235]) by aserv0021.oracle.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id tAKH1vCH019562 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 20 Nov 2015 17:01:57 GMT
Received: from abhmp0004.oracle.com (abhmp0004.oracle.com [141.146.116.10]) by aserv0121.oracle.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id tAKH1uXU024131; Fri, 20 Nov 2015 17:01:57 GMT
Received: from [192.168.1.27] (/174.7.250.104) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Fri, 20 Nov 2015 09:01:56 -0800
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0)
From: Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (13B143)
In-Reply-To: <CAHbuEH5X7kkQK=bhx8tHy7EBtYyfJfd-_ZSO=xY3iZ0MYOaquQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 09:01:54 -0800
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <2D3AD473-E2E0-4502-BC79-B3FA2FF7F089@oracle.com>
References: <CAHbuEH5nRQcKQMh8LDGdfBQ=Z4AWeKJxxCGV7V-gh_dSuSpb7w@mail.gmail.com> <7028747C-88DD-43BD-B0A4-FDEB7662A208@oracle.com> <CAHbuEH5X7kkQK=bhx8tHy7EBtYyfJfd-_ZSO=xY3iZ0MYOaquQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Source-IP: aserv0021.oracle.com [141.146.126.233]
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/pK05LLab-xi1GsBA4qZsbfbjcRA>
Cc: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 17:02:00 -0000
Looks good. (Sorry I missed this in my earlier message). I will add to Monday's revision. Phil > On Nov 20, 2015, at 08:36, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Phil, > > Thanks for your response on these questions, a few more comments > in-line and we should be able to wrap this up and move it to the next > phase quickly. > >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> wrote: >> Comments inline. >> >> Phil >> >> @independentid >> www.independentid.com >> phil.hunt@oracle.com >> >>> On Nov 16, 2015, at 12:37 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hello, >>> >>> I reviewed draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture and have a few questions. >>> >>> 1. Section 6, Threat Mitigation: >>> >>> Last sentence of first paragraph, "To >>> simplify the subsequent description we assume that the token itself >>> is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot >>> be modified." >>> >>> Since bearer tokens are not signed by default, is this proposing a >>> change? If so, where will that change occur? To state that "it is >>> assumed" without it being required anywhere is not a good assumption. >>> I'd still see this as a risk or security consideration. When OAuth is >>> re-used by other protocols, I am seeing that re-use leave off basic >>> protections that should be assumed like TLS, let alone digital >>> signatures. If this is required in the defined architecture (Section >>> 7 - it does show this, but there are no MUSTs that I can find), just >>> state that and refer to the requirement. >> >> [PH] I think the change is the point of the POP specifications. We are talking about a new class of tokens that are specifically not Bearer tokens thus the threat mitigation states that POP tokens are assumed to be digitally signed. > > Sure, but that is not spelled out in the requirements section and > should be. I think the issue may be that the requirements section > just says that the requirements are from RFC4962 and put into OAuth > terms. There isn't any text or list that says the following > requirements are added for this architecture and I would expect to see > that. Can you add that so you will be able to make such assumptions > with this architecture going forward and subsequent draft authors > would have clear guidance? > >> >> Was that not clear from the introduction? > > There should be something in the requirements section. The phrasing > of this particular sentence could be changed as follows (in addition > to adding a requirement): > > "To > simplify the subsequent description we assume in the POP > architecture that the token itself > is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot > be modified." > > Or something like: > "To > simplify the subsequent description we assume in this > architecture that the token itself > is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot > be modified." > > The second choice is added only because you don't seem to use the term > POP architecture in the draft, but it would be good to make it clear > that this draft adds this assumption, it is something new. > > >>> >>> 2. Section 6, Threat Mitigation >>> >>> Third paragraph, "As an example, TLS with a ciphersuite >>> that offers confidentiality protection has to be applied (which is >>> currently true for all ciphersuites, except for one). >>> >>> Please list a reference so the reader knows which ciphersuites are >>> acceptable from the recommended ones in RFC7525. I don't recall there >>> being any MTI ciphersuites for OAuth (I'm pretty sure there aren't and >>> that we've discussed that already with previous drafts, so this should >>> be spelled out more). >> [PH] I think this can be simplified a bit. I think this was referring to a “NULL” ciphersuite which is what 7525 says should not be done. We should also point to 7525. > > That would take care of it and would be a minor and clear change. Thank you! > >>> >>> 3. (Nit) Section 6.2, add a comma to improve readability >>> From: "Instead of providing confidentiality protection the authorization >>> server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected >>> token with the following semantic:" >>> To: "Instead of providing confidentiality protection, the authorization >>> server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected >>> token with the following semantic:” >> [PH] Will add to the next draft pending your comments on the above items. > > Thank you! > Kathleen > >> >>> Thank you all for your work on this draft! >>> -- >>> >>> Best regards, >>> Kathleen >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > -- > > Best regards, > Kathleen
- [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-arch… Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-… Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-… Phil Hunt