Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1: dropping password grant

Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> Tue, 18 February 2020 21:43 UTC

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From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 13:43:37 -0800
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1: dropping password grant
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Agreed. Plus, the Security BCP is already effectively acting as a grace
period since it currently says the password grant MUST NOT be used, so in
the OAuth 2.0 world that's already a pretty strong signal.

Aaron



On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 4:16 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> There is no need for a grace period. People using OAuth 2.0 can still do
> OAuth 2.0. People using OAuth 2.1 will do OAuth 2.1.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 18, 2020, at 3:54 PM, Anthony Nadalin <
> tonynad=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> I would suggest a SHOULD NOT instead of MUST, there are still sites using
> this and a grace period should be provided before a MUST is pushed out as
> there are valid use cases out there still.
>
> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Dick Hardt
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 18, 2020 12:37 PM
> *To:* oauth@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1: dropping password grant
>
> Hey List
>
> (Once again using the OAuth 2.1 name as a placeholder for the doc that
> Aaron, Torsten, and I are working on)
>
> In the security topics doc
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-14#section-2.4
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-14%23section-2.4&data=02%7C01%7Ctonynad%40microsoft.com%7C47bb597eef584c95ba4108d7b4b274b2%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637176550905333283&sdata=nA1S7TBfZg6cSwY2hI8hpRXhIA2joaaJFmNXrATgr2Y%3D&reserved=0>
>
> The password grant MUST not be used.
>
> Some background for those interested. I added this grant into OAuth 2.0 to
> allow applications that had been provided password to migrate. Even with
> the caveats in OAuth 2.0, implementors decide they want to prompt the user
> to enter their credentials, the anti-pattern OAuth was created to
> eliminate.
>
>
> Does anyone have concerns with dropping the password grant from the OAuth
> 2.1 document so that developers don't use it?
>
> /Dick
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Aaron Parecki
aaronparecki.com
@aaronpk <http://twitter.com/aaronpk>