Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Fri, 04 August 2017 18:13 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 12:13:06 -0600
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To: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt
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Just wanted to note that, in an off-list exchange, John has pushed back on
the idea to potentially drop mention of using x5c.

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 9:29 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>;
wrote:

> Thanks for the review, Vladimir.
>
> The text about which you have questions was written by Torsten (credit or
> blame where it's due!) but I believe he's out of the office for a bit so
> I'll try and answer.
>
> Your 1st question:
> I've had the same thought regarding the public key method and using the
> JWK x5c parameter. A JWK already has the public key, which is sufficient
> for comparison in the public key method. So x5c is just superfluous here. I
> believe that's a change that the next revision should have and will look to
> make it unless someone wants to make a strong case for needing x5c.
>
> Your 2nd question:
> I also found the sentence, "When used in conjunction with a trusted X.509
> certificate source, it also allows the client to rotate its X.509
> certificates without the need to change its respective authentication data
> at the authorization server." somewhat difficult to understand when I first
> read it. The intended meaning relies on content earlier in the same
> paragraph that says, "As pre-requisite, the client registers a X.509
> certificate or *a trusted source for its X.509 certificates (jwks uri as
> defined in [RFC7591])* with the authorization server."  Basically what
> it's trying to say is that when a client is registered or configured with a
> jwks_uri, then client key rotation can be done without needing to
> explicitly update the client config/registration with the AS. Does that
> explain it? I believe the text could be more straightforward and will
> endeavor to make it more clear in the next draft update.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 1:53 AM, Vladimir Dzhuvinov <
> vladimir@connect2id.com>; wrote:
>
>> Thanks everyone for the update! Having a clear distinction between the
>> PKIX vs public key bound methods will help interop, implementers' job, and
>> it also appears good for security.
>>
>> Questions:
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-
>> 03#section-2.3
>>
>> where the X.509 certificates are represented using the "x5c" parameter from [RFC7517 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7517>]
>>
>> For the public key method, is it really necessary for the client to
>> include its certificate in the JWK x5c parameter? This will make
>> implementation harder for developers, and I'm not sure it adds anything in
>> terms of security. Registering the public key parameters seems sufficient
>> to me.
>>
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-
>> 03#section-2.1
>>
>> When used in conjunction with a trusted X.509 certificate source, it also allows the client to rotate its X.509 certificates without the need to change its respective authentication data at the authorization server.
>>
>> I don't understand this - "in conjunction with a trusted X.509
>> certificate source"
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Vladimir
>>
>> On 28/07/17 21:33, Brian Campbell wrote:
>>
>> A new draft of "Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0" has been published with
>> the changes listed below based on comments and dissuasion in Prague.
>>
>>    draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03>
>>
>>
>>    o  Introduced metadata and client registration parameter to publish
>>       and request support for mutual TLS sender constrained access
>>       tokens
>>    o  Added description of two methods of binding the cert and client,
>>       PKI and Public Key.
>>    o  Indicated that the "tls_client_auth" authentication method is for
>>       the PKI method and introduced "pub_key_tls_client_auth" for the
>>       Public Key method
>>    o  Added implementation considerations, mainly regarding TLS stack
>>       configuration and trust chain validation, as well as how to to do
>>       binding of access tokens to a TLS client certificate for public
>>       clients, and considerations around certificate bound access tokens
>>    o  Added new section to security considerations on cert spoofing
>>    o  Add text suggesting that a new cnf member be defined in the
>>       future, if hash function(s) other than SHA-256 need to be used for
>>       certificate thumbprints
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>; <internet-drafts@ietf.org>;
>> Date: Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 12:25 PM
>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt
>> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
>>
>>
>>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.
>>
>>         Title           : Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0
>>         Authors         : Brian Campbell
>>                           John Bradley
>>                           Nat Sakimura
>>                           Torsten Lodderstedt
>>         Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt
>>         Pages           : 17
>>         Date            : 2017-07-28
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual
>>    authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for OAuth
>>    client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for
>>    certificate bound sender constrained access tokens.
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls/
>>
>> There are also htmlized versions available at:https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>>
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>>
>

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