Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend (TMI BFF)

Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> Wed, 17 February 2021 19:46 UTC

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 20:46:30 +0100
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To: Dominick Baier <dbaier@leastprivilege.com>
Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend (TMI BFF)
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>
> While someone will always say “but this doesn’t solve the XSS problem” -
> this is absolutely correct. But when there are no tokens in the browser -
> you can simply eliminate that part of the threat model ;)

The point was it doesn't eliminate anything, it just changes the
request/response data that is part of the attack. This doesn't increase
security, as a matter of fact, with regard to the RFC, we shouldn't talk
about security at all, since it has zero impact on it.

It is worth talking about that pattern as *one* possible solution to
maintaining sessions, but that's it.

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 8:43 PM Dominick Baier <dbaier@leastprivilege.com>
wrote:

> Yes - “no OAuth tokens in the browser” ;) They are all kept server-side
> and the BFF proxies the API calls if necessary. Also the RT management
> happens server-side and is transparent to the SPA.
>
> I see that in lots of industries - finance, health, cloud providers
>
> While someone will always say “but this doesn’t solve the XSS problem” -
> this is absolutely correct. But when there are no tokens in the browser -
> you can simply eliminate that part of the threat model ;)
>
> ———
> Dominick Baier
>
> On 17. February 2021 at 18:30:23, Vittorio Bertocci (
> vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com) wrote:
>
> Thanks Dominick,
>
> It is indeed a very simple spec, but as you can see from the discussion so
> far, it doesn’t appear to be trivial- and there might be some
> considerations we consider obvious (eg scope escalation) that might not be
> super clear otherwise.
>
> In terms of the guidance, just to make sure I get the scope right- that
> means that also code+PKCE+rotating RTs in JS would not be acceptable for
> your customers?
>
>
>
> *From: *Dominick Baier <dbaier@leastprivilege.com>
> *Date: *Wednesday, February 17, 2021 at 00:27
> *To: *Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net>
> *Cc: *Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <
> oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Mediating and session Information Backend
> For Frontend (TMI BFF)
>
>
>
> Hey,
>
>
>
> Tbh - I have a bit of a hard time to see why this requires a spec, if that
> is all you are aiming at. Wouldn’t that be just an extension to the “OAuth
> for web apps BCP?”.
>
>
>
> All I can add here is - this approach would not work for any of our
> customer. Because their real motivation is to implement a more and more
> common security guideline these days - namely: “no JS-accessible tokens in
> the browser” - but this document doesn’t cover this.
>
>
>
> cheers
>
> ———
>
> Dominick Baier
>
>
>
> On 16. February 2021 at 22:01:37, Brian Campbell (
> bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org) wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 15, 2021 at 9:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>
> Thank you again for the explanation.
>
> I think your assumption about the overall flow should be described in the
> draft.
>
>
>
> We did attempt to capture the assumptions in the draft but clearly could
> have done a better job with it :)
>
>
>
>
> As I understand it now the core contribution of your proposal is to move
> refresh token management from frontend to backend. Is that correct?
>
>
>
>  Taking that a bit further - the idea is that the backend takes on the
> responsibilities of being a confidential client (client creds, token
> acquisition, token management/persistence, etc.) to the external AS(s). And
> TMI BFF describes a way for that backend to deliver access tokens to its
> own frontend.
>
>
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