Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00.txt

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Fri, 04 November 2016 21:18 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2016 15:17:54 -0600
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Cc: Nat Sakimura via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi@lists.openid.net>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00.txt
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few little things inline...

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:41 AM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> I agree that the client_id is unlikely to be found inside the certificate
> itself. The client_id is issued by the authorization server for the client
> to use at that single AS. The certificate is issued by the CA for the
> client to use on any connection. The AS and CA are not likely to be the
> same system in most deployments. The client will use the same cert across
> multiple connections, possibly multiple AS's, but the same isn't true of
> the client_id.
>

You said it better than I.


> Additionally, I think we want to allow for a binding of a self-signed
> certificate using dynamic registration, much the way that we already allow
> binding of a client-generated JWK today.
>
Binding the client to a self-signed certificate is pretty similar to
binding to the public key. But I agree it should be possible.

The jwks_uri or jwks client registration metadata parameters are well
suited to convey such info. The JWKs in them can convey the public key
(obviously) but can also can convey a self-signed certificate with the
"x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) parameter.



> I do think that more examples and guidance are warranted, though, to help
> AS developers.
>

Noted.


>  -- Justin
>
> On 11/2/2016 5:03 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> wrote:
>
>>
>> I agree it is written so that the connection to the certificate is
>> implicitly required but I think it would be better if it was explicit
>> written since the lack of a connection would result in a potential security
>> hole.
>>
>
> That's fair. I agree it can be made more explicit and that it be good to
> do so.
>
>
>
>> When it comes to the client_id I think subject common name or maybe
>> subject serial numbers will be the common location, and I think an example
>> would be valuable.
>>
>>
>
> In my experience and the way we built support for mutual TLS OAuth client
> auth the client_id value does not appear in the certificate anywhere. I'm
> not saying it can't happen but don't think it's particularly common.
>
> I can look at adding some examples, if there's some consensus that they'd
> be useful and this document moves forward.
>
>
>
>>
>> I´m not saying it is a bad Idea just that I would prefer if it was not a
>> MUST.
>> With very limited addition of code it is just as easy to get the
>> certificate attribute for client id as it is to get it from the HTTP
>> request data (at least in java). I also think that with the requirement to
>> match the incoming certificate in some way one has to read out the
>> certificate that was used to establish the connection to do some kind of
>> matching.
>>
>>
> Getting data out of the certificate isn't a concern. I just believe that
> the constancy of having the client id parameter is worth the potential
> small amount duplicate data in some cases. It's just a -00 draft though and
> if the WG wants to proceed with this document, we seek further input and
> work towards some consensus.
>
>
>
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