Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error code for missing client certificate
Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com> Fri, 12 November 2021 13:31 UTC
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From: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 16:30:44 +0300
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, 乗松隆志 / NORIMATSU,TAKASHI <takashi.norimatsu.ws@hitachi.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error code for missing client certificate
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Just to make sure I understand the process, is it going to be something like draft-XXXXXX-oauth-mtls-rfc8705-bis -> draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-rfc8705-bis -> new RFC that will obsolete the current one? CCing my colleague Takashi Norimatsu who worked on MTLS holder-of-key for Keycloak, perhaps he has more ideas for improvements. As for this stance: > The MTLS draft also re-uses “Bearer” as a token header, which is also a > mistake in my opinion. > Did you mean the re-use of the "Bearer" scheme for the Authorization header and WWW-Authenticate challenge? If so, and if we decide to introduce a new scheme, I think this would imply a new value for the "token_type" token response attribute as well. Of particular interest to me is the question whether different binding mechanisms (DPoP, MTLS) could co-exist, or should they be mutually exclusive; this deserves a separate thread though. - Dmitry On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 10:22 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: > Only if this working group wanted to take up the work of making a new > revision of the standard, but I haven't seen any indication of desire to do > that here. One possibility is for you to propose an update as an individual > draft to the group here. > > -Justin > ________________________________________ > From: Dmitry Telegin [dmitryt@backbase.com] > Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2021 1:34 PM > To: Justin Richer > Cc: oauth > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error code for missing > client certificate > > Thanks for the reply. That makes sense. > > Given that MTLS is not a draft but rather a proposed standard (RFC 8705), > do you think there is a chance the changes you proposed could land in MTLS > one day? > > On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 6:24 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto: > jricher@mit.edu>> wrote: > This is just my interpretation, but this feels more like invalid token, > because you’re not presenting all of the material required for the token > itself. The DPoP draft has added “invalid_dpop_proof” as an error code, > which I think is even better, but the MTLS draft is missing such an element > and that is arguably a mistake in the document. The MTLS draft also re-uses > “Bearer” as a token header, which is also a mistake in my opinion. > > But given the codes available, “invalid_token” seems to fit better because > you aren’t messing up the request _to the resource_ itself, you’re messing > up the token presentation. > > — Justin > > On Nov 10, 2021, at 10:17 AM, Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt= > 40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:dmitryt=40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> > wrote: > > Any updates on this one? The missing certificate case looks more like > "invalid_request" to me: > > > invalid_request > The request is missing a required parameter, includes an > unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same > parameter, uses more than one method for including an access > token, or is otherwise malformed. The resource server SHOULD > respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code. > > > On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 2:23 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com > <mailto:dmitryt@backbase.com>> wrote: > From the document: > > > The protected resource MUST obtain, from its TLS implementation > layer, the client certificate used for mutual TLS and MUST verify > that the certificate matches the certificate associated with the > access token. If they do not match, the resource access attempt MUST > be rejected with an error, per [RFC6750< > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6750>], using an HTTP 401 status > code and the "invalid_token" error code. > > Should the same error code be used in the case when the resource failed to > obtain a certificate from the TLS layer? This could happen, for example, if > the TLS stack has been misconfigured (e.g. verify-client="REQUESTED" > instead of "REQUIRED" for Undertow), and the user agent provided no > certificate. > > Thanks, > Dmitry > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >
- [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error code f… Dmitry Telegin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Dmitry Telegin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Dmitry Telegin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Dmitry Telegin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… 乗松隆志 / NORIMATSU,TAKASHI
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… 乗松隆志 / NORIMATSU,TAKASHI
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error co… Justin Richer