Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03.txt

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Fri, 03 March 2017 21:52 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2017 18:52:44 -0300
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To: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig@sics.se>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03.txt
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We rethought aud in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-campbell-oauth-resource-indicators

We wanted it to work with bearer tokens so that the AS could put a audience in the token that could not be faked by a malicious RS. 
For the bearer token use case it needs to be a URI to avoid the client being tricked.

For a PoP token it could be logical if the token proof presentment mechanism is secure against RS spoofing.

Presentment mechanisms that are bound to TLS by a EKM or via mutual TLS are OK.
At the application layer the presentment would need sign over the resource URI to prevent forwarding.
Something that used only a signature over a challenge would still rely on there being a unspoofable  audience in the AT itself.

You could securely do a secure logical resource for bearer.

It could be something like the RS would provide its logical resource URI as part of a authenticate response along with the scopes required.

The client could de-refrence the logical scope URI to retrieve a JSON object containing back pointers to the physical resource URI covered by that logical audience.
It could also contain other RS meta-data.

We do something like that in connect to allow multiple redirect URI to generate the same pairwise identifier. 
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html#SectorIdentifierValidation <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html#SectorIdentifierValidation>

RS discovery has been shuffled aside in the WG foe the moment.

I would be OK with res/aud being a logical identifier if it points to meta-data like aud in id_tokens points to meta-data for the AS.

I think making res/aud a free form string would come back and bite us on the ass.

John B.


> On Mar 3, 2017, at 9:10 AM, Ludwig Seitz <ludwig@sics.se> wrote:
> 
> On 2017-02-24 22:58, John Bradley wrote:
>> I updated the references but haven't made any other changes.
>> 
>> I had some questions about it so though it was worth keeping alive
>> at-least for discussion.
>> 
>> There have been some other questions and proposed changes.
>> 
>> I will take a look through them and see if what may be worth updating.
>> 
>> John B.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Question about the 'aud' parameter: Wouldn't it be useful to allow other values than URIs for that one?
> 
> One could easily imagine a group identifier as value of that field, where the RS internally resolves whether it is part of that group and therefore the target audience of that token.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Ludwig
> 
> -- 
> Ludwig Seitz, PhD
> Security Lab, RISE ICT/SICS
> Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51
> 
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