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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2024 09:33:57 -0500
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I see that people are uncomfortable with making any mandates, and so I've
tried to be purely descriptive in this proposal. I leave it to the WG to
decide where to put it, but I see it as a wholesale replacement for some
sections to emphasize clarity.

 "SD-JWT conceals only the values that aren't revealed. It does not meet
standard security notations for anonymous credentials. In particular
Verifiers and Issuers can know when they have seen the same credential no
matter what fields have been opened, even none of them. This behavior may
not accord with what users naively expect or are lead to expect from UX
interactions and lead to them make choices they would not otherwise make.
Workarounds such as issuing multiple credentials at once and using them
only one time can help for keeping Verifiers from linking different
showing, but cannot work for Issuers. This issue applies to all selective
disclosure based approaches, including mdoc. "

Sincerely,
Watson

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I see that people are uncomfortable with making any m=
andates, and so I&#39;ve tried to be purely descriptive in this proposal. I=
 leave it to the WG to decide where to put it, but I see it as a wholesale =
replacement for some sections to emphasize clarity.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>=C2=A0&quot;SD-JWT conceals only the values that aren&#39;t revealed. It =
does not meet standard security notations for anonymous credentials. In par=
ticular Verifiers and Issuers can know when they have seen the same credent=
ial no matter what fields have been opened, even none of them. This behavio=
r may not accord with what users naively expect or are lead to expect from =
UX interactions and lead to them make choices they would not otherwise make=
. Workarounds such as issuing multiple credentials at once and using them o=
nly one time can help for keeping Verifiers from linking different showing,=
 but cannot work for Issuers. This issue applies to all selective disclosur=
e based approaches, including mdoc. &quot;<br></div><div><br></div><div>Sin=
cerely,</div><div>Watson<br></div></div>

--00000000000084b49f062a050129--

