Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation

George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com> Mon, 25 January 2016 15:30 UTC

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To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com>
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From: George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com>
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Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 10:30:10 -0500
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation
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I'm still catching up... but to this point specifically...

Doesn't this require that the same client_id NOT be used simultaneously 
at two (or more) Authorization Servers? If so, I don't believe that is a 
viable option. It's a little late in the game to be putting requirements 
on the AS as to how it generates it's client_id.

Thanks,
George

On 1/25/16 9:11 AM, John Bradley wrote:
>
> Returning the iss and client_id from the authorization endpoint per 
> Mike’s draft allows the client to reject the authorization response 
> and not leak the code.