Re: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd Review of draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Mon, 01 December 2014 12:19 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Mon, 01 Dec 2014 09:18:59 -0300
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd Review of draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05
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Hannes,

You seem not to like the idea of client credential rotation.

This is something we have wrestled with from the very beginning of Connect Dynamic client registration.
In the early drafts we re-used the client secret for authentication to the registration/update endpoint. 

That was rejected by developers as too likely to cause unrecoverable errors if transactions fail. 
eg the server thinks it has rotated the secret, but the client doesn't  correctly get the response.
They also found the dual use of client secret confusing.

When we added OAuth protection to registration,  it made sense to use the same mechanism to protect the endpoint for updates.
This allowed the client secret rotation to be recoverable if there was a problem.

Ultimately we didn't do updates for symmetric client secrets in the Connect version, leaving that for the IETF draft.

Via registration of a jwks_uri in Dynamic Client registation, server based clients can rotate asymmetric keys.  
However that doesn't  help native clients at all, given that they can't publish a jwks_uri without some other protocol and credentials to push it to a server (Turtles).

You ask why have the complexity of key rollover when the client can just re-register (start the protocol flow from the start)

The answer to that is that many AS use sticky scopes.  If a client_id is granted scope "x" by a user then the user is not re-prompted to authorize scope "x"  again for that client if the client asks for scopes "x" and "y" on a later request.   When the client's access/refresh tokens expire and the user is sent back to the AS for a new code the AS wants to reduce the complexity of the dialogs.
(Privacy people may argue that people should be re-prompted every time but that is not the current practice)

If the client must get a new client_id every time it rotates it's secret, then all of the previous grants are going to get blown away, and it would need to invalidate all it's refresh tokens and start again re authorizing every user.   That is such a scary idea to clients that they would just never volunteer to rotate credentials, servers would also probably never enforce rotation as well as this would be seen as breaking OAuth.

Clients needing to have two client_id and secrets to avoid blowing away refresh tokens also adds a lot of complexity to clients and would require a total rewrite.

We could somehow migrate grants and refresh tokens over to a new client_id and secret,  however this also seems more complicated for both the client and AS, not really achieving anything more than rotating the secret alone.

So that leaves us with the question of is it necessary to rotate symmetric client secrets in the first place?

When HTTP basic is used for client authentication the client_secret is a password that is passed in effectively plain text as part of the request.

There are two issues to consider:

1. Brute force attacks,  this can be mitigated by using high entropy passwords (eg 256 bit) however RFC 6749 doesn't  provide any guidance on that point. (I suspect most people based on the examples are using 60-70 bits of entropy)  For low entropy passwords rotation is required(especially since rate limiting may be difficult, yes I do have an attack in mind)

2. Man in the middle attacks.  SSL encryption is deprecated but I suspect is going to take a while to be turned off on the server side.  Mobile clients could loose both there secret and refresh token due to this attack, or other certificate/DNS attacks.   Rotation limits the window that those credentials are good for.  (though in many cases all the damage that could be done can be done in one go)

While I would like to get rid of symmetric key rotation I don't think we can given the current deployment landscape.

John B.

> On Dec 1, 2014, at 6:27 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> 
> Hi Justin,
> 
> a few comments inline:
> 
> On 11/26/2014 02:32 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
>> And by “6790” below I obviously mean RFC6749.
>> 
>> (Note to self, don’t write working group emails this early in the morning.)
>> 
>> — Justin
>> 
>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:31 AM, Justin Richer <jricher@MIT.EDU
>> <mailto:jricher@MIT.EDU>> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 2:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig
>>> <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Hi Justin,
>>>> 
>>>> thanks for your quick response. A few remarks below.
>>>> 
>>>> On 11/24/2014 10:11 PM, Richer, Justin P. wrote:
>>>>> Hannes, thank you for the review. Answers inline.
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Hannes Tschofenig
>>>>> <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Hi Justin, Mike, John, Maciej,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> as part of my shepherd write-up I carefully read through
>>>>>> draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05. Overall the document is in
>>>>>> good shape but I have a few minor clarification questions that
>>>>>> should be resolved before the document goes to the IESG.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In Section 1.4. "Registration Tokens and Client Credentials" you
>>>>>> explain the different credential types and I was wondering why you
>>>>>> aren't issuing client_secrets to all clients instead of introducing
>>>>>> another credential, the registration access token. While you try to
>>>>>> explain the reasons those appear somewhat constructed. For example,
>>>>>> you say that "not all types of clients have client credentials" but
>>>>>> you are the author of the specification and you can essentially
>>>>>> decide what to do. The registration access token is essentially the
>>>>>> same as the client credential since it is "is uniquely bound to the
>>>>>> client identifier".
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I believe we have discussed this issue in the past but I don't
>>>>>> remember what the reasoning was. Can you describe what your design
>>>>>> rational was (and add it to the document)?
>>>>> 
>>>>> That's exactly the question this section is trying to answer, and if
>>>>> it can be made clearer then please suggest some text that will help
>>>>> that purpose. The rationale for the registration access token is very
>>>>> simple: we want to have a means to call the management endpoint in a
>>>>> protected manner, and treating the management endpoint as an OAuth
>>>>> Protected Resource makes a lot of sense. RFC6750 gives us the means
>>>>> to make an authorized call to an API endpoint, so we're re-using that
>>>>> instead of trying to invent some other mechanism. Shouldn't we be
>>>>> helping the world get away from API passwords?
>>>>> 
>>>>> And it's very true that not every client is going to have a client
>>>>> secret to use at the token endpoint -- some will have no use of one
>>>>> (public and implicit clients) and some will be using TLS or
>>>>> asymmetric keys (JWT assertions, for instance) or other mechanisms to
>>>>> authenticate that don't involve the secret. Instead of forcing these
>>>>> clients to use a client secret for one new endpoint, or forcing that
>>>>> endpoint to potentially support the infinite number of client
>>>>> authentication mechanisms, we decided to just use OAuth. These are
>>>>> OAuth clients, remember -- they will *all* have the ability to send
>>>>> OAuth tokens to a protected resource already built in.
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Here is the point I don't quite get: the registration access token is
>>>> essentially the same as a client secret. You as a specification author
>>>> essentially decides whether clients will get a client secret or a
>>>> registration access token. It is under your control.
>>>> 
>>>> To be more specific, here is what you could have done:
>>>> 
>>>> C -> S: Client Registration Request
>>>> C <- S: Client Information Response (with new client secret)
>>>> 
>>>> C -> S: Read or Update Request (with client id/client secret)
>>>> C <- S: Client Information Response
>>>> 
>>>> Instead, you currently have this exchange:
>>>> 
>>>> C -> S: Client Registration Request
>>>> C <- S: Client Information Response (with new reg. access token)
>>>> 
>>>> C -> S: Read or Update Request (with client id + reg. access token)
>>>> C <- S: Client Information Response
>>>> 
>>>> Do you see the similarity that I see?
>>> 
>>> For clients that use a client secret to authenticate to the token
>>> endpoint, your point makes sense, but for clients who would not
>>> otherwise have a client secret, it doesn’t. You end up with a
>>> confusing state where you’re giving somebody a “client_secret” which
>>> is defined in 6790 to be used at the token endpoint but then telling
>>> them not to use it at the token endpoint (where they use something
>>> else or do’t use it at all) but to use it at this new endpoint
>>> instead. Can you see the confusion point here? I think it’s only going
>>> to get worse as we get more clients that use auth mechanisms that
>>> don’t depend on a shared secret (public key, TLS, etc.). 
>>> 
>>> Instead we’re giving people an OAuth access token to access a
>>> protected API, something that OAuth clients ought to know how to do
>>> anyway. This mechanism also gives us an opportunity to potentially use
>>> the new PoP tokens (once they’re actually defined) in place of the
>>> bearer credential that’s defined today. 
>>> 
> 
> I believe I now understand your line of argument.
> 
> You are saying that re-using the client secret for this purpose will
> confuse developers since the client credential is used in other places
> as well.
> 
> So, the confusion could then be:
> 
> * Client starts the dynamic client registration exchange without a
> client secret.
> * Later than that exchange he gets a client secret, which is supposed to
> be used for the dynamic client registration management only
> * A developer might think that he can now also use that client secret
> with anything else as well where a client secret can be used.
> 
> 
> The questions are now:
> 
> a) Is this potential confusion real or just imagined?
> b) Wouldn't this be desired behaviour to begin with?
> 
> If it is a real concern and if you don’t' want to have that behaviour
> then maybe you want to motivate the design decision in that direction in
> Section 1.4.
> 
> 
> 
>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In Section 1.4.1. "Credential Rotation" you write:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> " The Authorization Server MAY rotate the client's registration
>>>>>> access token and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret")
>>>>>> throughout the lifetime of the client. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> You might want to add reasons why the authorization server may want
>>>>>> to take this step.
>>>>> 
>>>>> OK, but there's nothing normative here in my view. It's basically up
>>>>> to the auth server to say "well let's make a new credential". Can you
>>>>> suggest text that would clarify this?
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> What about making the spec simpler by not allowing credential rotation?
>>>> Rekying is a useful concept under two circumstances, namely
>>>> * when they provide a performance improvement (such as it is the case
>>>> with session resumption in TLS where you can do an abbreviated handshake
>>>> without all the heavy public key crypto)
>>>> * when the entrophy of the key is exhausted, which typically happens if
>>>> you exceed a number of data packets sent under a given key. Often this
>>>> is tied to the way how freshness is ensured and the need to avoid
>>>> encrypting data with the same initialization vector/nonce twice.
>>>> 
>>>> Neither of these two cases seem to apply here (IMHO).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Rekeying the client is useful in a whole lot more cases than these
>>> two, and most of them boil down to “Something seems fishy”. I think if
>>> anything we need to eventually figure out how to do *more* secret
>>> rotation, including a proactive mechanism started by the client (as
>>> Brian has mentioned, among others). 
>>> 
> 
> 
> The alternative to rekeying (or secret rotation) inside the dynamic
> client registration management protocol is to actually re-start the
> protocol run from scratch.
> 
> To me it is not obvious whether the added complexity for credential
> rotation is worth the effort given the alternative.
> 
> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> There are also a bit too many SHOULDs in the document. Every time
>>>>>> you write SHOULD you have to keep in mind to tell the reader what
>>>>>> happens in the other case. For example, in Section Section 1.4.1
>>>>>> you write:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> " The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response
>>>>>> to an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at
>>>>>> which point the new registration access token is returned to the
>>>>>> client and the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by
>>>>>> both parties. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Here the question arises whether you are using the SHOULD to
>>>>>> indicate that the authorization server does not always need to
>>>>>> rotate the registration access token and if he does then is must
>>>>>> only happen in response to an update request or does it indicate
>>>>>> that the authorization server could also rotate it in response to
>>>>>> other calls?
>>>>> 
>>>>> It's more that the server SHOULD NOT throw out a registration access
>>>>> token that a client still thinks is good without some way to
>>>>> communicate the new token to the client. Think of it this way, you've
>>>>> got the token, the server decides to chuck it on you -- what do you
>>>>> do? You can try calling your READ or UPDATE operations to get the new
>>>>> one but no dice, your token is bad. So what we're saying here is not
>>>>> to throw out the client's only means of finding out if its keys are
>>>>> good anymore.
>>>> 
>>>> I think I got confused with the description of the state management (as
>>>> described in the document). There is some fuzziness.
>>>> 
>>>> Here I would prefer to have either no rekeying (which would make the
>>>> issue go away) or a very deterministic way of rekeying.
>>>> 
>>>> I prefer the former.
>>> 
>>> I’m not a fan of enforcing permanent credentials on the world. And we
>>> have the same construct with refresh tokens today, for what it’s worth.
> 
> It is only permanent in the sense of a full dynamic client registration
> management protocol run.
> 
> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Also, in the second line one would wonder why the old registration
>>>>>> access token isn't mandatorily discarded. If there are good
>>>>>> reasons, then tell the reader.
>>>>> 
>>>>> We've tried to put requirements on the server discarding tokens in
>>>>> the past, but there was significant pushback from providers who use
>>>>> non-revocable time-limited tokens. Maybe they won't be doing that
>>>>> here, for the reason above.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> I wouldn't reflect that in the document. Of course, you can never be
>>>> sure that the implementation really discards any state but for the
>>>> purpose of the protocol state machine it is gone.
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Furthermore, the text in Section 2.2 seems to contract this
>>>>>> statement: " If the authorization server includes a new client
>>>>>> secret and/or registration access token in its response, the client
>>>>>> MUST immediately discard its previous client secret and/or
>>>>>> registration access token. "
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is a requirement on the client, not the server, so it's not
>>>>> bound by the token lifetime restrictions above. We're telling the
>>>>> client to stop using a secret or token after it's been given a new
>>>>> one, that's fine.
>>>> 
>>>> OK
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> In Section 2.2 you write: " However, since read operations are
>>>>>> intended to be idempotent, the read request itself SHOULD NOT cause
>>>>>> changes to the client's registered metadata values. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I am wondering whether this SHOULD NOT statement adds a lot of
>>>>>> value since you allow the request to change metadata values.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think you're right, since the metadata values might have changed
>>>>> through outside forces since the client last read, and all the
>>>>> clients need to be able to deal with that. We can remove that line.
>>>> 
>>>> OK
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> You also write the security consideration section: " the
>>>>>> registration access token MAY be rotated when the developer or
>>>>>> client does a read or update operation on the client's client
>>>>>> configuration endpoint. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This means that the content of the registration access token may
>>>>>> also change with a read operation.
>>>>> 
>>>>> That's correct.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Terminology:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Sometimes you write "Client Information Response" and sometimes
>>>>>> "client information response" The same with "Authorization Server"
>>>>>> and "authorization server"
>>>>> 
>>>>> They're all supposed to be lower cased, as is the style in RFC6749. I
>>>>> tried to bump everything down in a previous edit but it looks like I
>>>>> missed some.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Typo:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> " Some values in the response, including the "client_secret" and
>>>>>> r"egistration_access_token", MAY be ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>>>>> different from those in the initial registration response. "
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks, noted!
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In Section 2.4 "Client Delete Request" you write:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> " The authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate all
>>>>>> existing authorization grants and currently-active tokens
>>>>>> associated with this client. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Under what circumstances wouldn't the authorization invalidate all
>>>>>> grants and active tokens?
>>>>> 
>>>>> When it's using a non-revocable stateless token and it can't
>>>>> physically do that. Too bad 2119 doesn't have MUST IF POSSIBLE or
>>>>> equivalent.
>>>> 
>>>> Maybe it would be good to add this information.
>>>> 
>>>> It might also be worthwhile whether this notion of a non-vocable
>>>> stateless token actually exists in this context since we are really
>>>> talking about the same infrastructure here. This registration management
>>>> mechanism is really very central to the authorization server (unlike
>>>> some other access token mechanisms where we talk about the resource
>>>> server, which may be in a different administrative domain even).
>>> 
>>> Why doesn’t the existing SHOULD cover this?
> 
> Because the should does not explain when to revoke the grants/tokens and
> when not to do it. You wrote it in this email (in context of these
> non-revocable tokens) but how should an implementer know when he reads
> through the draft?
> 
> The problem is really about assumptions being made that are not
> explained further. For example, the assumption that there are tokens
> that are not revocable and the implications that result from those on
> the design of the protocol (potentially at multiple places in the
> document).
> 
> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> You might also want to say what tokens you are talking about since
>>>>>> there are at least the following tokens around: - access tokens -
>>>>>> refresh tokens - registration access tokens - initial access token
>>>>> 
>>>>> OK, we can add that.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> " If the server does not support the delete method, the server
>>>>>> MUST respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Why aren't you demanding that the server must support this method?
>>>>>> This would essentially mean that there would be some cases where
>>>>>> deregistration isn't possible. Of course, there may be the question
>>>>>> how important deregistration actually is if the registration
>>>>>> automatically expires.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Because delete is not always an easy operation to implement. The
>>>>> client should be able to call the endpoint with the DELETE verb and
>>>>> at least know if it's allowed to do that or not.
>>>> 
>>>> Hmmm. I didn't know that the delete method is difficult to implement.
>>> 
>>> Depends on your infrastructure and how things get propagated between
>>> components.
> 
> There are a number of unstated assumptions here that would be worthwhile
> to point out.
> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> You write: " If the client does not exist on this server, the
>>>>>> server MUST respond with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration
>>>>>> access token used to make this request SHOULD be immediately
>>>>>> revoked. "
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> If the client does not exist and someone sends a request with a
>>>>>> random registration access token I am not sure what exactly you
>>>>>> want to revoke here.
>>>>> 
>>>>> It's not the case of a random token, it's the case of a client having
>>>>> been deleted but using an otherwise valid access token. If the
>>>>> token's no good, you don't get this far -- you return a 401 as
>>>>> defined in RFC6750.
>>>> 
>>>> I guess it might make sense to add this information.
>>> 
>>> It’s already in there, in the paragraph just before the one you quoted:
>>> 
>>>   If the registration access token used to make this request is not
>>>   valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
>>>   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750>].
>>> 
> 
> 
> But the argument that you provided is for "the case of a client having
> been deleted but using an otherwise valid access token" but the text you
> cite talks about the registration access token not being valid. Those
> appear to be two different cases.
> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In Section 3.1. "Client Information Response" you state the new
>>>>>> elements that are returned to the client. While the client_secret
>>>>>> has an expires_at field the registration_access_token doesn't. Does
>>>>>> the expiry value of the client_secret_expires_at automatically
>>>>>> indicate the lifetime of the  registration access token? I think
>>>>>> so. But what happens if the client_secret is not issued? To make it
>>>>>> more complicated you write the following text in the security
>>>>>> consideration section:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> " While the client secret can expire, the registration access
>>>>>> token SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively
>>>>>> registered. "
>>>>> 
>>>>> There isn't a separate expiration for the registration access token
>>>>> because it's not supposed to unceremoniously expire on a client. It
>>>>> should be good until it gets rotated out on a future read/update
>>>>> operation or the client's registration is no good anymore.
>>>> 
>>>> I think it might be good to have a small section that explains how state
>>>> management works.
>>> 
>>> Can you suggest text for this beyond the paragraph that’s already there?
> 
> Yes, I can do that. If you could ship a new update then I can read
> through the entire document again and figure out how to create a state
> machine.
> 
> If you, of course, get rid of this credential rotation then I don't have
> to do it though.
> 
> 
>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The IANA consideration section is empty. Wouldn't it be necessary
>>>>>> to register 'registration_access_token' and
>>>>>> 'registration_client_uri' into the OAuth Dynamic Registration
>>>>>> Client Metadata Registry?
>>>>> 
>>>>> No, these are not client metadata. The client can not send these in a
>>>>> registration request, so they don't need to be in there.
>>>> 
>>>> Really?
>>>> 
>>>> I thought that the IANA registry created with Section 5.1 of
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-20 was meant to be
>>>> used with the Client Registration Request and the Client Registration
>>>> Response exchange. The  'registration_access_token' and
>>>> 'registration_client_uri' parameters are used in the response.
>>>> 
>>>> Looking again at draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-20 I noticed an inconsistency:
>>>> The protocol interaction should either be
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> C -> AS: Client Registration Request
>>>> C <- AS: Client Registration Response
>>>> 
>>>>           OR
>>>> 
>>>> C -> AS: Client Registration Request
>>>> C <- AS: Client Registration Error Response
>>>> 
>>>> Currently, sometimes the term "Client Registration Response" or "Client
>>>> Information Response" is used. We need to fix this since it spills over
>>>> to the management API document as well.
>>> 
>>> Client Information Response and Client Error Response are sub-classes
>>> of Client Registration Response. If that’s not clear from the current
>>> document, please suggest new wording to make it clearer.
> 
> As a shepherd I read through both documents in detail and I didn't
> figure that out. That gives me reasons to believe that others wouldn't
> figure that out either.
> 
> I would make the change already in Figure 1 of Dynamic Client
> Registration Protocol document.
> 
> 
> 
>        +--------(A)- Initial Access Token (OPTIONAL)
>        |
>        |   +----(B)- Software Statement (OPTIONAL)
>        |   |
>        v   v
>    +-----------+                                      +---------------+
>    |           |--(C)- Client Registration Request -->|    Client     |
>    | Client or |                                      | Registration  |
>    | Developer |<-(D)- Client Registration Response---|   Endpoint    |
>    |           |                                      +---------------+
>    +-----------+
> 
> Client Registration Response:=
>                 Client Information Response OR
>                 Client Error Response
> 
> Same change to Figure 1 in the dynamic client registration management
> document. You could even indicate in the figure which parts are already
> specified in the dynamic client registration spec and which are added
> via the dynamic client registration management doc.
> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Also, I noticed that we say that the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC
>>>> 5246 and/or TLS 1.0. We definitely cannot say TLS 1.0 anymore.
>>> 
>>> Kathleen made a similar comment on dyn-reg and suggested text that
>>> we’ll incorporate (unless there are objections from others on the list).
> 
> Ack.
> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> In Figure 1 it might be useful to indicate that exchanges A, B, C, and D
>>>> are inherited from the dynamic client registration document and only
>>>> step D is enhanced with additional parameters, as described in Section
>>>> 3.1. Furthermore, I wonder whether it would make sense to somehow
>>>> indicate in the figure that the endpoints are actually part of the
>>>> Authorization Server.
>>> 
>>> While they usually are the same in practice, these endpoints might not
>>> be part of the Authorization Server — they might be part of a separate
>>> (but related) service that handles objects of various kinds within a
>>> security domain. No reason to tie them together unnecessarily. 
> 
> You can state that someone in the text but endpoints by itself don't
> exist since they have to be at some server. Even if the endpoints are in
> separate boxes there needs to be a close cooperation between the two
> since otherwise we create new interoperability challenges.
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes
> 
>>> 
>>> — Justin
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> -- Justin
>>>>> 
>>>> 
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>>> 
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>> 
> 
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