[OAUTH-WG] Re: Alternative text for sd-jwt privacy considerations.

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Fri, 27 December 2024 14:17 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2024 07:17:18 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Alternative text for sd-jwt privacy considerations.
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I feel like this thread has strayed a bit from its origin, which was some
text Watson proposed for the privacy considerations
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/ugVBj2O0hw-nuWNVTFpt0JH3yVY

>From my perspective, it wouldn't be a wholesale replacement for anything
but, assuming the co-authors and WG in general are okay with it, something
along those lines could be incorporated into the existing considerations.

On Thu, Dec 26, 2024 at 6:28 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
wrote:

> I am appalled!
>
> All humans must adapt to the consent plans of this small standards group!
> I for one do not plan to adapt - sorry about that!
>
> Peace ..tom jones
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 26, 2024 at 4:15 PM David Waite <david@alkaline-solutions.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On Dec 26, 2024, at 10:38 AM, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > This problem was clearly demonstrated by the California mDL hackathon
>> where the default presentation was ALL DATA. That is the easiest path, so
>> it remains the one most taken. We have known since standards were first
>> introduced that they immediately create a drive to the bottom. This will be
>> the fate of this standard as well. The most permissive interpretation will
>> be the most common. The user's desires will not be met.
>> >
>>
>> The consequence of splitting out the policy for controlling data release
>> from the issuing authority is that the complexity that was the business
>> logic for handling requests, determining if they are appropriate for the
>> use case, prompting the user for consent, etc. is now all complexity pushed
>> into the (likely third party) user agent.
>>
>> Architectures like PRIVACYPASS create individual solutions to release a
>> particular type of information in the most privacy-preserving manner they
>> are capable of. This sort of business logic is baked into the protocol, and
>> the scope of implementation is thus boxed to solve that particular problem.
>> The user agent can only work per the spec if it intends to work properly,
>> and following the specification (hopefully) leads to a complete
>> implementation.
>>
>> The majority of verifiable credentials systems proposed have no such
>> bounds - which is one reason you are likely to see credentials often scoped
>> to be issued only to specific, qualified wallets in production. Those
>> specific user agents will enforce the required security and privacy
>> requirements the issuer has for their credential. That is both their own
>> policy logic to be enforced (such as a credential being bound to hardware),
>> as well as their own requirements for appropriate user behavior (such as
>> mandatory authentication and mandatory disclosure before the credential is
>> released). That could include verifier authentication and having the holder
>> agent confirm the verifier is authorized by the issuer to make the sort of
>> request they are making - before a user consent prompt ever enters the
>> picture.
>>
>> You could say that the captcha usage of privacy pass and AAMVA mDL usage
>> are the same in that they develop trust frameworks that define the network
>> of acceptable participants. I suspect however that the requirements for the
>> latter contain significantly more requirements and potentially new
>> technical works.
>>
>> A mDL hackathon has likely not set such policy or mandated that mDL and
>> readers abide by it. They may not even have wanted to limit participants to
>> having support for specifying complex queries (especially with the
>> OpenID4VP query language changes which occurred recently). I’m not
>> surprised a hackathon defaulted to a wide-open attribute policy.
>>
>> -DW
>
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