[OAUTH-WG] We cannot trust Issuers

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Mon, 22 July 2024 21:11 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 14:11:42 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] We cannot trust Issuers
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Dear Oauth,

I'm disappointed to see SD-JWT work continue with inadequate privacy
considerations. The fact is an Issuer can link any showings to
issuance of the credential. This is not foregrounded sufficiently in
privacy considerations, nor do we discuss how to ensure users are
aware. We really need to use more RFC 2119 language and highlight
these issues. Section 11.1 about local storage which has never been an
IETF concern before is far more prescriptive than 11.4, and that's not
a good thing. To be clear, the threat model must include an issuer
that is a government issuing credentials that if used to verify age on
certain websites or via a digital wallet on site, and learned about by
the issuer who may have access to data from the site, will result in
imprisonment or execution. This is not a hypothetical scenario.

Users and UX designers will have intuitions that do not match the
reality and that result in bad decisions being made. That's on us. A
driver's license doesn't leave a trace of where you showed it, but the
SD-JWT does.

At a minimum I think we mandate batch issuance and one time usage
using RFC 2119 language. We need to say in clear, unambiguous English
that this mechanism enables an issuer to connect every presentation of
a credential to the issuance.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

-- 
Astra mortemque praestare gradatim