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[OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?

Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Wed, 06 May 2020 17:48 UTC

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 10:48:08 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?
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Hello!

We would like to have PKCE be a MUST in OAuth 2.1 code flows. This is best
practice for OAuth 2.0. It is not common in OpenID Connect servers as the
nonce solves some of the issues that PKCE protects against. We think that
most OpenID Connect implementations also support OAuth 2.0, and hence have
support for PKCE if following best practices.

The advantages or requiring PKCE are:

- a simpler programming model across all OAuth applications and profiles as
they all use PKCE

- reduced attack surface when using  S256 as a fingerprint of the verifier
is sent through the browser instead of the clear text value

- enforcement by AS not client - makes it easier to handle for client
developers and AS can ensure the check is conducted

What are disadvantages besides the potential impact to OpenID Connect
deployments? How significant is that impact?

Dick, Aaron, and Torsten

ᐧ

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