IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [OAUTH-WG] issuing new refresh tokens

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Tue, 13 July 2010 20:37 UTC

Return-Path: <beaton@google.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68C4C3A69F0 for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -101.81
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-101.81 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.167, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AKzQWg6cQVov for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp-out.google.com (smtp-out.google.com [74.125.121.35]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6936A3A690D for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from kpbe20.cbf.corp.google.com (kpbe20.cbf.corp.google.com [172.25.105.84]) by smtp-out.google.com with ESMTP id o6DKbrV9006619 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:53 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=beta; t=1279053474; bh=g1kRAIbc2dNPfJE0DDi7iAXszcs=; h=MIME-Version:In-Reply-To:References:Date:Message-ID:Subject:From: To:Cc:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=DNxP/EO8A2XIgGdaeR3ItLsKgzI5YxKcE8Dpwg/c937UKEKVQiQzRQR2bjnaZHQgL LLS3jU4gAznu0tqVy114g==
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; s=beta; d=google.com; c=nofws; q=dns; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to: cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-system-of-record; b=HumDpcFjZj+NzxMW3j2Eze0GdGxRd9tO/3q/YIj7aXxHNN7+OjRuhraSJwazzPmn3 C5godC7U1Jzt610Y4uRlA==
Received: from pwi10 (pwi10.prod.google.com [10.241.219.10]) by kpbe20.cbf.corp.google.com with ESMTP id o6DKbpiq003293 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:52 -0700
Received: by pwi10 with SMTP id 10so2661686pwi.20 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:51 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.142.233.1 with SMTP id f1mr14067817wfh.169.1279053471750; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.142.193.19 with HTTP; Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:51 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimP82bx8oO4MiTdpEUxlmJZwZB_FtpNRQGHN3fS@mail.gmail.com>
References: <AANLkTin9GHCvTA0jQziYW3klZe78Yx1b9Op-eaxJDzEK@mail.gmail.com> <AANLkTimP82bx8oO4MiTdpEUxlmJZwZB_FtpNRQGHN3fS@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 13:37:51 -0700
Message-ID: <AANLkTime-gng9Mu0I_ERJyD5JHigklFDUvIwywN9xaOW@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-System-Of-Record: true
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] issuing new refresh tokens
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 20:37:46 -0000

On Tue, Jul 13, 2010 at 1:10 PM, Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I'm pretty sure anyone issuing cryptographic refresh tokens is crazy,
>> these pretty much have to be backed by server-side state or there is
>> no way to run your system.
>
> Brian, can you tell me what you mean by cryptographically implemented
> refresh token, and why using one would be crazy?  You say using them would
> require server-side state.  I'd say just the opposite.  If you are signing
> your refresh tokens (a cryptographic operation) you don't need to store them
> on the auth server, but if you aren't using cryptography, then you must
> store the tokens on the auth server in order to validate them when they come
> back to you.
> So in short, I'm thinking the opposite of what you state.  So please
> enlighten me.  What am I missing?

You and I are on the same page.  Let me try again.

Anyone implementing OAuth 2 needs to store information about issued
refresh tokens server-side, otherwise basic functionality such as
revocation is not possible.

Cryptographically implemented refresh tokens, without that
corresponding server-side state, are crazy.

v2.43.4 | Report a Bug | By Email | System Status