Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-par-02.txt

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Thu, 23 July 2020 07:53 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 08:53:50 +0100
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References: <CA+k3eCRWSFGHPb9Yo1POR_YqZLELyhEuYuUsObcXMebxtnySBg@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-par-02.txt
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Can you expand on the risks of replay? It seems like if the request can be replayed an attacker can also block the original request and inject the URI into a different request - ie no replay. 

(Shouldn’t state and/or PKCE and/or nonce prevent replay already?)

In general the draft could do with some discussion of why an attacker being able to modify an authorization request is a risk. I might just be lacking enough coffee this morning to understand the risk here. 

— Neil

> On 22 Jul 2020, at 23:14, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> Thanks Vladimir, both comments should be easy to address in -03 (HTTPS/TLS required and SHOULD on short lifetime *and* single use). 
> 
>> On Sun, Jul 19, 2020 at 12:55 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote:
>> Thanks for the update. With the "require PAR" AS and client metadata the spec is now "policy complete". I can't think of what else there is to add.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I have two comments about -02:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par-02#section-2
>> 
>> I didn't see a mention of https / TLS being required for the PAR endpoint. The reader could assume http is fine.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par-02#section-2.2
>> 
>>>    Since the request URI can be replayed, its lifetime SHOULD be short
>>>    and preferably limited to one-time use.
>> The SHOULD is ambiguous here - does it apply to the lifetime only, or to the lifetime and the single use.
>> 
>> 
>> Vladimir
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/07/2020 21:36, Brian Campbell wrote:
>>> WG,
>>> 
>>> A new -02 draft of "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests" has been published. A summary of the changes, taken from the document history, is included below for ease of reference.  
>>> 
>>>    -02
>>> 
>>>    *  Update Resource Indicators reference to the somewhat recently
>>>       published RFC 8707
>>> 
>>>    *  Added metadata in support of pushed authorization requests only
>>>       feature
>>> 
>>>    *  Update to comply with draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-21, which requires
>>>       "client_id" in the authorization request in addition to the
>>>       "request_uri"
>>> 
>>>    *  Clarified timing of request validation
>>> 
>>>    *  Add some guidance/options on the request URI structure
>>> 
>>>    *  Add the key used in the request object example so that a reader
>>>       could validate or recreate the request object signature
>>> 
>>>    *  Update to draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-25 and added note regarding
>>>       "require_signed_request_object"
>>> 
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>>> Date: Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 1:21 PM
>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-par-02.txt
>>> To: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Dave Tonge <dave@tonge.org>, Nat Sakimura <nat@sakimura.org>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-par-02.txt
>>> has been successfully submitted by Brian Campbell and posted to the
>>> IETF repository.
>>> 
>>> Name:           draft-ietf-oauth-par
>>> Revision:       02
>>> Title:          OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
>>> Document date:  2020-07-10
>>> Group:          oauth
>>> Pages:          18
>>> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-oauth-par-02.txt
>>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/
>>> Htmlized:       https://tools..ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par-02
>>> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par
>>> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-par-02
>>> 
>>> Abstract:
>>>    This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
>>>    which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
>>>    authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
>>>    request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
>>>    reference to the data in a subsequent authorization request.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>> 
>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
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>> -- 
>> Vladimir Dzhuvinov
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
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> 
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