Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object

[Nat Sakimura <[e-mail]>]

So, where should we take it to?
Just add back client_id as it used to be?

On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 6:55 AM John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: John Bradley <[e-mail]>
> Date: Sat, Jan 18, 2020, 9:31 PM
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authorization Request
> (JAR) vs OIDC request object
> To: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
>
>
> If you put the iss in the JWE header it is integrity protected, as JWE
> only supports AAD encryption algs.
>
> It is more of a problem when the client is sending a requestURI in that
> case having the clientID in the GET to the Authorization endpoint is useful.
>
> I think there is a argument for explicitly allowing the clientID as long
> as it exactly matches the clientID in the JAR.
>
> John B.
>
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 11:53 PM Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 08:44:18AM -0500, Justin Richer wrote:
>> > I don’t agree with this stance from a security or implementation
>> perspective.
>> >
>> > If there’s a clear order of precedence for the information, it’s not
>> particularly problematic. Everything inside the request object is to be
>> taken over things outside the request object. We have the exact same
>> semantics and process with dynamic registration, where the software
>> statement is carried alongside plain JSON claims, and the two are mixed
>> with a very simple algorithm:
>> >
>> >  - If a field is inside the signed payload, use that value and ignore
>> any copy of it on the outside
>> >  - If a field is not inside the signed payload and is outside the
>> signed payload, use the outside value
>> >
>> > Can someone please point out a concrete security issue with this
>> algorithm? This is the extent of the “merge” semantics that we need here,
>> and it would solve not only the ability to use this for use cases that call
>> for a more static request object (perhaps signed by a third party and not
>> the client) along side the plain parameters that can vary, but also the
>> backwards compatibility issue that’s been discussed. With this algorithm in
>> place, you could have OIDC clients actually be compliant with the spec,
>> since OIDC requires replication of the values inside the request object on
>> the outside with exact matches. An OIDC server wouldn’t be fully compliant
>> with the new spec since it would reject some compliant JAR requests that
>> are missing the external parameters, but that’s fairly easy logic to add on
>> the OIDC side. And in that case you get a matrix of compatibility like:
>>
>> I agree that the merge algorithm is simple and fairly straightforward to
>> implement.  But, as Joseph has been alluding, it's only simple if you've
>> already made the decision to use all the parameters, both from inside and
>> from outside the signed payload.  The security risk lies about having to
>> make the trust decision twice, more than the mundane details of actually
>> doing the merge.  (Though there is still some latent risk, given that
>> we've
>> seen some really crazy quality of implementation out there.)
>>
>> It's certainly *possible* that things end up fine in many well-deliniated
>> cases where merging can be used.  But it's more complicated to reason
>> about, and I don't remmber seeing much previous discussion about the
>> specifics of the double trust decision.
>>
>> -Ben
>>
>> >
>> >               JAR Server | OIDC Server  |
>> > ------------+------------+--------------+
>> > JAR Client  |     YES    |      NO      |
>> > OIDC Client |     YES    |     YES      |
>> >
>> > Breaking one out of the four possible combinations in a very
>> predictable way is, I think, the best way to handle backwards compatibility
>> here.
>> >
>> > But between this issue and JAR’s problematic call for the value of a
>> request_uri to always be a JWT and be fetchable by the AS (neither of which
>> are true in the case of PAR) makes me think we need to pull this back and
>> rework those things, in a push back to the IESG’s comments.
>> >
>> >  — Justin
>> >
>> >
>> > > On Jan 16, 2020, at 7:38 PM, Joseph Heenan <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>> > >
>> > > I agree with this, particularly the security concerns of merging. If
>> we merge, we can much guarantee there will eventually be a security issue
>> where an attacker is able to gain an advantage by adding a parameter to the
>> url query (which the server would then happily process if that parameter
>> isn’t found inside the request object). Ruling out that case makes security
>> analysis (particularly when creating new OAuth2 parameters) significantly
>> simpler.
>> > >
>> > > Putting the iss in the JWE header and having the client_id duplicated
>> outside the request object seem to address all the concerns I’ve seen
>> raised.
>> > >
>> > > (It seems like it may be unnecessary to have the client_id duplicated
>> outside if the request_uri is a PAR one though.)
>> > >
>> > > Joseph
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >> On 16 Jan 2020, at 22:40, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> I agree with the IESG reasoning that merging is problimatic.  Once we
>> > >> allow that given a unknown list of possible paramaters with diffrent
>> > >> security properties it would be quite difficult to specify safely.
>> > >>
>> > >> Query paramaters can still be sent outside the JAR, but if they are
>> in
>> > >> the OAuth registry the AS MUST ignore them.
>> > >>
>> > >> Puting the iss in the JWE headder addresses the encryption issue
>> without
>> > >> merging.
>> > >>
>> > >> I understand that some existing servers have dependencys on getting
>> the
>> > >> clientID as a query paramater.
>> > >>
>> > >> Is that the only paramater that people have a issue with as oposed
>> to a
>> > >> nice to have?
>> > >>
>> > >> Would allowing the AS to not ignore the clientID as a query
>> paramater as
>> > >> long as it matches the one inside the JAR, basicly the same as
>> Connect
>> > >> request object but for just the one paramater make life easier for
>> the
>> > >> servers?
>> > >>
>> > >> I am not promising a change but gathering info before proposing
>> something.
>> > >>
>> > >> John B.
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> On 1/16/2020 1:53 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> > >>> On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 11:02:33PM +0200, Vladimir Dzhuvinov wrote:
>> > >>>> On 14/01/2020 19:20, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>> > >>>>> Well, embedding a client_id claim in the JWE header in order to
>> > >>>>> achieve "request parameters outside the request object should not
>> be
>> > >>>>> referred to" is like "putting the cart before the horse". Why do
>> we
>> > >>>>> have to avoid using the traditional client_id request parameter so
>> > >>>>> stubbornly?
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>> The last paragraph of Section 3.2.1
>> > >>>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1> of RFC 6749
>> says
>> > >>>>> as follows.
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>>   /A client MAY use the "client_id" request parameter to identify
>> > >>>>>   itself when sending requests to the token endpoint.  In the
>> > >>>>>   "authorization_code" "grant_type" request to the token endpoint,
>> > >>>>>   *an unauthenticated client MUST send its "client_id" to prevent
>> > >>>>>   itself from inadvertently accepting a code intended for a client
>> > >>>>>   with a different "client_id".*  This protects the client from
>> > >>>>>   substitution of the authentication code.  (It provides no
>> > >>>>>   additional security for the protected resource.)/
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>> If the same reasoning applies, a client_id must always be sent
>> with
>> > >>>>> request / request_uri because client authentication is not
>> performed
>> > >>>>> at the authorization endpoint. In other words, */an
>> unauthenticated
>> > >>>>> client (every client is unauthenticated at the authorization
>> endpoint)
>> > >>>>> MUST send its "client_id" to prevent itself from inadvertently
>> > >>>>> accepting a request object for a client with a different
>> "client_id"./*
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>> Identifying the client in JAR request_uri requests can be really
>> useful
>> > >>>> so that an AS which requires request_uri registration to prevent
>> DDoS
>> > >>>> attacks and other checks can do those without having to index all
>> > >>>> request_uris individually. I mentioned this before.
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> I really wonder what the reasoning of the IESG reviewers was to
>> insist
>> > >>>> on no params outside the JAR JWT / request_uri.
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> I'm beginning to realise this step of the review process isn't
>> > >>>> particularly transparent to WG members.
>> > >>> Could you expand on that a bit more?  My understanding is that the
>> IESG
>> > >>> ballot mail gets copied to the WG precisely so that there is
>> transparency,
>> > >>> e.g., the thread starting at
>> > >>>
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/lkOhwiDj_hCI55BQRdiR9R0JwgI
>> > >>> Which admittely is from almost three years ago, but that's the
>> earliest
>> > >>> that I found that could be seen as the source of this behavior.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> -Ben
>> > >>>
>> > >>> P.S. some other discussion at
>> > >>>
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/-tUrNY1X9eI_tQGI8T-IGx4xHy8
>> and
>> > >>>
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/Uke1nxRlgx62EJLevZgpWCz_UwY
>> and
>> > >>> so on.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>> OAuth mailing list
>> > >>> [e-mail]
>> > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> > >>
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-- 
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en