Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh Tokens

Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com> Fri, 12 August 2011 18:00 UTC

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Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 14:00:50 -0400
From: Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh Tokens
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Precisely!  In fact the anonymity of this sort can be achieved even 
without a refresh token: as long as the end user is not required to 
authenticate to the client.

But for all I remember, we have never had a SINGLE USE CASE (sorry to 
transition to my pet peeve) that required anonymity.  The original and 
overarching OAuth requirement has been not to reveal user credentials; 
the refresh tokens were required in order to make end-user's life 
easier. In short, I do not recall anonimity being the end.

I have no doubt that Tony has a new important use case, and I think we 
should document it, derive requirements from it, and pursue this in the 
next OAuth release.

Igor



On 8/12/2011 11:10 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
> OAuth allows a client to access user resources without revealing the 
> resource owner's identity to the client. Isn't this anonymity? I 
> consider this an important property of the protocol.
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
>
> On Thu, 11 Aug 2011 21:00:54 -0400, Barry Leiba wrote:
>> This seems to need a chair to step in.  Tony is taking a strong stand
>> and maintaining it:
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:40 PM, Anthony Nadalin
>> <tonynad@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>> Nowhere in the specification is there explanation for refresh 
>>> tokens, The
>>> reason that the Refresh token was introduced was for anonymity. The 
>>> scenario
>>> is that a client asks the user for access. The user wants to grant the
>>> access but not tell the client the user's identity. By issuing the 
>>> refresh
>>> token as an 'identifier' for the user (as well as other context data 
>>> like
>>> the resource) it's possible now to let the client get access without
>>> revealing anything about the user. Recommend that the above 
>>> explanation be
>>> included so developers understand why the refresh tokens are there.
>>
>> So far, though it's been only half a day, I've seen several posts
>> disagreeing with Tony, and none supporting any change to the text for
>> this.  We're close to ending WGLC, so please post here if you agree
>> with Tony's suggested change.  Otherwise, it looks like consensus is
>> against.
>>
>> Barry, as chair
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
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