[OAUTH-WG] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-09: (with COMMENT)

["Ben Campbell" <[e-mail]>]

Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-09: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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I concur with Alissa's discuss.  

Additional comments:

-- There is no reference to RFC 2119, but there seems to be lots of
capitalized 2119 keywords. If those are intended to have the 2119
meaning, please add the usual reference. (I assume that these are
intended as 2119 keywords for the remainder of the review.)

-- 2.1, first paragraph:

If the server MAY support GET, how does a client know to use it? Would
you expect them to try and fail?

-- 3

Is there a reason not to use a more standard IANA procedure? (I.e. let
people request registrations to IANA, and have them forward the requests
to the DE?)

--3.1, under "Name"

The MUST seems unnecessary, as that's the whole point of a registry.

-- 4:
The security considerations have a lot of restated 2119 keywords. If you
want to reinforce those here, it would be better to do so with
descriptive language, rather than having multiple occurrences of the same
normative language.  Redundant normative language is error prone,
especially for future updates.

-- 4, bullet list:


It seems odd to have 2119 keywords in a "For instance" section.

--4, 6th paragraph from end

The reference to [TLS.BCP] should probably be normative.

-- 4, last two paragraphs: 

"An authorization server offering token introspection MUST be able to
understand the token values being presented to it during this call." and
"the authorization server MUST be able to decrypt and validate the token
in order to access this information."

These seem more like statements of fact than normative language.