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Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt

Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> Tue, 08 August 2017 19:42 UTC

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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
Organization: Connect2id Ltd.
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Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2017 22:42:10 +0300
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt
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On 07/08/17 19:09, Salz, Rich wrote:
>> A while ago, if I'm not mistaken, I glimpsed some report of vulnerabilities
>> caused by incorrect public key comparison.
> There was a recent issue raised by Hanno about incorrect public/private key matching leading to incorrect revocation of a certificate; was that what you were thinking of?
Thanks Rich, I was able to find it now. The issue apparently affects
public/private key matching, not public/public key matching, so it
shouldn't be a concern for mTLS:

https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/888-How-I-tricked-Symantec-with-a-Fake-Private-Key.html

Vladimir

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