Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] -security-topics-13 and OIDC response types + form_post response mode

Encrypted JARM responses are in a very similar position. Access Token value is not part of the URL and the response itself is protected. Such response is usually only consumed by a server side application. Same as any form_post response. 

We could go into further clarifying the client application topology to enable these uses but i don’t think it’s worth it. Why make excuses to keep implicit issued access tokens around in when code flow is the way the WG has decided to go. (Here we go again...)

Best,
Filip

> 27. 12. 2019 v 21:41, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>:
> 
> 
> As Brian said, we have discussed this several times and this text found consensus.
> 
> Using post reduces the attack surface but does not allow to bind the access token to the legitimate client. We are recommending sender constrained access tokens in the BCP. So recommending a flow that does not support sender constrained access tokens is a contradiction.
> 
> What do other WG members think?
> 
>>> Am 27.12.2019 um 21:28 schrieb Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>:
>>> 
>> 
>> I agree with Brian. Please update the text to describe this already safe usage.
>> 
>> -- Mike
>> 
>> From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
>> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2019 11:03:30 AM
>> To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [OAUTH-WG] -security-topics-13 and OIDC response types + form_post response mode
>>  
>> We have a-sometimes used scenario where a client makes an authorization/authentication request with a "token id_token" response type and "form_post" response mode (nonce is also sent and exact redirect URI matching is done at the AS). The access token is never exposed in any URLs and access token injection is prevented by the at_hash claim in the id token. 
>> 
>> That seems to me like a legitimate and reasonable usage scenario. However, it would fall on the wrong side of the SHOULD NOT in Section 3.1.2 of the Security BCP-to-be, which has:
>> 
>>    In order to avoid these issues, clients SHOULD NOT use the implicit
>>    grant (response type "token") or any other response type issuing
>>    access tokens in the authorization response, such as "token id_token"
>>    and "code token id_token", unless the issued access tokens are
>>    sender-constrained and access token injection in the authorization
>>    response is prevented.
>> 
>> I know this particular text has been discussed over and over again so I hate to revisit it. But based on the aforementioned scenario I think maybe it still doesn't quite hit the mark. Access token injection is prevented. The token leakage scenarios mentioned in that section are all avoided. And while I know sender-constrained is recommended elsewhere in the draft, it's not really a realistic option for the majority of deployments. 
>> 
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