[Openpgp-dt] Design Team Meeting notes 2022-04-26

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Wed, 27 April 2022 00:21 UTC

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: openpgp-dt@ietf.org
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Subject: [Openpgp-dt] Design Team Meeting notes 2022-04-26
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OpenPGP Design Team Meeting
2022-04-26

Present:
    
    stephen
    gniibe
    justus
    jeffrey
    dkg
    daniel huigens

dkg: how're we doing? justus: not too bad

# some discussion of issue #48
	- https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/issues/48
	- TODO: dkg will read discussion and react

# https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/merge_requests/171
	- has a thumbs-down from daniel H
	- agreement that status quo is pretty weird
	- question is how to armor revocation signatures (as cert or as det-sig)
	- v4 does this as a cert but not ubiquituously followed
	- goals: clarify v4 and define something clear for v5
	- justus: 
		- bare revocation sigs imply inefficiency figuring out what key is being revoked
		- viewing armor as comments means he doesn't care but understands other codebases differ
		- uncomfortable with idea of partial certs (response: v4 does some of that we can try avoid for v5)
	- outcome: clarify v4 "special revocation certificate" that only has sig but say MUST NOT do that for v5 but MUST instead include public key in rev cer
	- aside: nobody seems to implement designated revokers?
	- outcmoe: 
		- TODO: dkg to fix #171 to remove "bad" text 
		- TODO: daniel H to create a new MR along the lines implied in his comments (people pondering that)

# https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/merge_requests/155
	- CRC24 stuff wasn't clear in 4880
	- justus: not many implementations need this
	- we should say one SHOULD NOT include this checksum unless interop with legacy implementations is needed 
	- outcome: justus to tweak #155
	- daniel H: we also need to fix this elsewhere in 6.2 and in all examples
		- TODO: justus says he'll handle those too in #155

# https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/merge_requests/156
	- still has thumbs-down from Paul
	- was discussed last week
	- since RSA is likely to be deprecated in full, make it MUST NOT generate less than 3072
	- TODO: outcome: dkg to fix based on last week's meeting notes
	
# El Gamal and FF DSA
   - huigens wants to deprecate them both.
   - TODO: make MRs that deprecate each algorithm.
   

# https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/merge_requests/173
	- some chat about potential FUD-window meaning we don't want folks to get rid of RSA key gen code entirely but after discussion SF was fine with the text as-is

# https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/issues/107
	- we want to encourage actual use of v5 sigs but if v5 keys can emit v4 sigs that may not happen (much)
	- we might try the tls-fake-version approach but don't know if that would work
	- TODO: dkg to send e-mail to the WG asking for patches (ideally backportable)