Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft

[Ben Laurie <[e-mail]>]

Jon Callas wrote:
> 
> I think we ought to keep it with the same algorithm number.
> 
> I'm happy to put in SHA-224 (meaning it's trivial work), but I don't
> like it, myself. The reason is that SHA-224 is really a truncated
> SHA-256. Thus, it has no advantages over SHA-256 except being smaller by
> 32-bits with 112 bits of security. The reason it exists at all is for
> crypto-balance with 2-key 3DES (which is not TDEA), which we don't allow
> at all.

<pedantic>

3-key DES also has a strength of 112 bits.

</pedantic>

> I don't think we should have it as it goes against our
> principles of wanting a minimum of 128-bits of security in OpenPGP.
> (Yes, yes, I know that SHA-1 doesn't meet this either, but until
> SHA-256, we didn't have many options. That doesn't mean the principle is
> wrong; we *have* options.)
> 
>     Jon
> 
> 


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