RE: security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?
Trevor Perrin <Tperrin@sigaba.com> Fri, 27 September 2002 19:28 UTC
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From: Trevor Perrin <Tperrin@sigaba.com>
To: Trevor Perrin <Tperrin@sigaba.com>, "'email@example.com'" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "'email@example.com'" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Subject: RE: security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 12:23:04 -0700
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Fixed a typo- >-----Original Message----- >From: email@example.com [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org] > >5.13. >[...] Unlike the Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet, no > special CFB resynchronization is done after encrypting this prefix > data. > >doesn't this prevent converting packet 18 to 9 ? > It doesn't completely prevent the JKS attack. The attacker can still copy the first two blocks of ciphertext from a packet 18 to 9, and the check bytes will decrypt appropriately, but the remainder of the second block will be scrambled. So this will probably leave a malformed packet header, but there's a chance the header might still work, depending on how strict the parsing code is (for example, what if the packet tag gets randomly set to 11 for Literal Data, but the length is wrong?). The attacker can flip bits in the remainder of the second block and keep submitting guesses to a decryption oracle, until he stumbles on a packet header that makes the attack work. The attacker may also learn information from observing the oracle which lets him reconstruct the keystream bytes that the ciphertext is being XOR'd with. For example, if the oracle says "Error: packet tag 62 not supported", the attacker can reconstruct the keystream bits that correspond to the packet tag, and thus gain the ability to control its value. Trevor