Re: [openpgp] [Last-Call] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Wed, 29 November 2023 18:43 UTC

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Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 13:43:19 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Linda Dunbar <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
cc: gen-art@ietf.org, draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] [Last-Call] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12
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On Wed, 29 Nov 2023, Linda Dunbar via Datatracker wrote:

Using my Author Hat only.

> Nits/editorial comments:
> Some of the steps described for "Confidentiality/authentication via Encryption"
> are not clear to me. Hope the authors can answers the following questions:
>
> Section 2.1: Step 3 says that the Sender using Public Key to encrypt the
> Session Key. The  Step 5 says that the Receiver decrypts the Session Key using
> recipient's Private Key. Shouldn't Sender and Recipient use DH with both Public
> Key and Private Key to encrypt and decrypt the Session Key?

You cannot use a DH key exchange because there is no live connection.
The message is encrypted offline, transported and then decrypted
(possibly offline)

There is some talk about adding forward secrecy as a new feature in the
working group, but how that would work exactly is not yet known (eg
something like a double ratchett like setup maybe?)

Paul