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[openpgp] Re: Encryption subkey selection

Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com> Thu, 10 April 2025 09:13 UTC

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From: Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com>
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Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 10:12:58 +0100
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Subject: [openpgp] Re: Encryption subkey selection
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On 10 Apr 2025, at 08:57, Falko Strenzke <falko.strenzke@mtg.de> wrote:
> 
> Section 6 currently says: "If there are no usable subkeys in the replacement certificate, then [...]"
> I would write instead "If the subkeys in the replacement certificate are not useable, then [...]”

I like this change; I will apply it now. Thanks!

A

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