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Re: ECC in OpenPGP

Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Fri, 03 September 2010 20:56 UTC

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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Andrey Jivsov <openpgp@brainhub.org>
Cc: OpenPGP Working Group <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>
Subject: Re: ECC in OpenPGP
References: <1282856536.11340.29.camel@fermat.scientia.net> <87pqx4mm0b.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <04ac7894a29b891da7cbde98adb287e5@imap.dd24.net> <83BF96BC-A771-4511-B431-9B9B1545E351@callas.org> <49ee22eb2e5747f077b3bc885f197083@imap.dd24.net> <87y6boj5e0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4C7C4939.8050009@iang.org> <B095E184-5B6A-4339-9AD7-86568C0E43CC@callas.org> <4C801651.80201@brainhub.org>
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Date: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 22:55:31 +0200
In-Reply-To: <4C801651.80201@brainhub.org> (Andrey Jivsov's message of "Thu, 02 Sep 2010 14:25:37 -0700")
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Andrey Jivsov <openpgp@brainhub.org> writes:

> NIST is working on SP 800 131, in which RSA 2048 is the minimum
> allowed algorithm, corresponding to 110 bit security. The document
> suggests to disallow PKCS#1.5 padding after 2013. If we are going to
> address this, it makes sense to do such a significant change together
> along with ECC, as specified in
> http://sites.google.com/site/brainhub/pgp.

Supporting PKCS#1 v2.0 padding sounds like a separate effort though.  Is
anyone interested in that?

/Simon

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