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Re: [openpgp] The Argon2 proposal seems incomplete (Draft 6)

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 29 July 2022 14:55 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 10:54:52 -0400
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References: <87r124m64c.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de>
Cc: Justus Winter <justus@sequoia-pgp.org>, Bruce Walzer <bwalzer@59.ca>, openpgp@ietf.org
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To: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] The Argon2 proposal seems incomplete (Draft 6)
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[ speaking as individual]

On Jul 29, 2022, at 08:56, Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> CFB+MDC is a proper encryption system the we came up in 2000 with still
> no known attacks.  It is slow, though.  Thus a faster and easy to
> implement AE mode makes a lot of sense.  This is why we started to
> deploy OCB decryption capability years ago, so that in a few years it
> can replace the CFB+MDC mode.

This is still possible and likely used by the majority of users?

> The whole new complex "crypto-refresh" AE stuff to support the brittle
> GCM is a dead end.  Well, unless you want to put OpenPGP back into the
> geek-only domain.

I don’t see how adding GCM for those who want or need FIPS compliance, or want faster native webcrypto support, would cause non-geek users to drop out of using openpgp. Can you explain how you think that would happen ?

Paul

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