Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft
James Couzens <james.couzens@electricmail.com> Tue, 14 March 2006 22:00 UTC
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Subject: Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft
From: James Couzens <james.couzens@electricmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2006 13:31:57 -0800
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> We might want to think about making SHA-256 be another MUST algorithm. > The only MUST hash now is SHA-1. Making SHA-256 be a MUST would make > these new key sizes be more useful, and also give us an easier fallback > if SHA-1 should be broken. SHA-1 was broken, last month by three Chinese cryptographers as reported by Bruce Schneier through is website. On February 15, 2006 he wrote of a new cryptographic result, an attack faster than brute-force against SHA-1. Two days later he wrote an update to his original post and a quote from within it: > Earlier this week, three Chinese cryptographers showed that SHA-1 is not > collision-free. That is, they developed an algorithm for finding collisions > faster than brute force. > > ... > > They can find collisions in SHA-1 in 2^69 calculations, about 2,000 times > faster than brute force. Right now, that is just on the far edge of > feasibility with current technology. Two comparable massive computations > illustrate that point. Reference URL (02/18/2006): http://tinyurl.com/4rl78 Original post (02/15/2006): http://tinyurl.com/4bmcc With respect to your suggestion about thinking about making SHA-256 a MUST algorithm I couldn't agree more. Cheers, James -- James Couzens, Programmer ___ __ __ ___ | __| \/ |/ __| The Electric Mail Company | _|| |\/| | (__ Managed, Secure Email Services |___|_| |_|\___| http://www.electricmail.com Direct Line: 604.482.1111 x152 -------------------------------------------------- PGP Key Fingerprint: B2EF B741 1807 2F24 8B70 F89B 03D2 6CFF C52F 0052
- NIST publishes new DSA draft David Shaw
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft "Hal Finney"
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft James Couzens
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft "Hal Finney"
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft James Couzens
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft "Hal Finney"
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ian Grigg
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Werner Koch
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ben Laurie
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ben Laurie
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft vedaal
- RE: NIST publishes new DSA draft Anton Stiglic
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft David Shaw
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft "Hal Finney"
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft David Shaw
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ian G
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Werner Koch
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft David Shaw
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Jon Callas
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Jon Callas
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ian G
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft David Shaw
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Tony Hansen
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft David Shaw
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ben Laurie
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Jon Callas
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Jon Callas
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Ben Laurie
- Re: NIST publishes new DSA draft Jon Callas