Re: [openpgp] Spoofing OpenPGP and S/MIME Signatures in Emails

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Wed, 01 May 2019 03:43 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: ilf <ilf@zeromail.org>, "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [openpgp] Spoofing OpenPGP and S/MIME Signatures in Emails
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Date: Wed, 01 May 2019 03:43:44 +0000
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Spoofing OpenPGP and S/MIME Signatures in Emails
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ilf <ilf@zeromail.org> writes:

>https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired
>https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/master/paper/johnny-fired.pdf

Thus confirming Shamir's law, "crypto is bypassed, not attacked".  When I get
asked to perform a security assessment of something involving crypto, I look
for the crypto code, ignore it, and look at the code next to it.  I've never
failed to find vulns there.  

Crypto code in software is a beacon pointing you to where to the
vulnerabilities are.

Peter.