Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint schemes
Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Tue, 12 April 2016 00:13 UTC
Return-Path: <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
X-Original-To: openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE1A012D9F3 for <openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 Apr 2016 17:13:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zpI0jTs2lyUZ for <openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 Apr 2016 17:13:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from che.mayfirst.org (che.mayfirst.org [162.247.75.118]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B548512D6D3 for <openpgp@ietf.org>; Mon, 11 Apr 2016 17:13:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from fifthhorseman.net (unknown [38.109.115.130]) by che.mayfirst.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 492B5F997; Mon, 11 Apr 2016 20:13:29 -0400 (EDT)
Received: by fifthhorseman.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 181AF20143; Mon, 11 Apr 2016 20:13:24 -0400 (EDT)
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IETF OpenPGP <openpgp@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwgqbv4S94M2xYua4gAOWFxr_Kt5y6X8tQEWkaf7weeH+A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4C08CDDD-4C06-41AD-9797-7DD6F08ECD06@gmail.com> <2AA5B912-0AE6-4722-8BC7-66E37559C0B1@callas.org> <D17B23A3-633F-4E4E-BC14-69ED6060F357@gmail.com> <6E221A61-7AB2-4E0B-B64D-60F210A0131F@callas.org> <E9A5B4B3-0EEC-4E86-8CEC-6680A24BE44F@gmail.com> <0D7A75AB-74C6-40E9-87C5-BA6F05FCDBF7@callas.org> <87oa9jo5sp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <9C461E78-DC60-4B9D-A0DF-170F4759A57D@callas.org> <5E793A3D-128D-470A-8DF7-50827F39E02F@gmail.com> <20160410211449.GA12408@littlepip.fritz.box> <CAMm+Lwgqbv4S94M2xYua4gAOWFxr_Kt5y6X8tQEWkaf7weeH+A@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Notmuch/0.21+124~gbf604e9 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.5.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2016 20:13:20 -0400
Message-ID: <87wpo3smzj.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha512"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/EKeMkuD4FSumRGNvF46HMxx4vao>
Subject: Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint schemes
X-BeenThere: openpgp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Ongoing discussion of OpenPGP issues." <openpgp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/openpgp>, <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/openpgp/>
List-Post: <mailto:openpgp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp>, <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 00:13:33 -0000
On Mon 2016-04-11 08:04:20 -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > Fingerprints are used for two purposes. > > 1) To define a trust anchor. > 2) To verify that a purported trust anchor is correct > > Only the first of these requires the ability to enter the fingerprint > at a keyboard. . For my own practice, i've found that i do better verification by typing in a fingerprint than by reading and checking in my own head. if i'm asked to compare two fingerprints that are displayed to me on different media (say, a computer screen and a business card), i observe that i simply lose patience and focus before the comparison is completed and tend to opt toward "yeah that's good enough". But with the other approach, it's pretty easy to power through the "data entry" task of transcribing the (relatively short) fingerprint from the business card to the computer, and just let the machine do the fingerprint comparison. I have no idea how prevalent these particular cognitive biases are with other humans, but i'd be reluctant to say that we should expect people to always do verification of fingerprints without data entry. > The most efficient way that is compliant with existing > keyboards etc. is Base32. While not all keyboards have latin > characters, there is an effective limit on the number of keys, screen > real estate etc. Here is a link to base32 encoding for folks who aren't used to it: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#section-6 a base32-encoded bitstream should be marginally smaller than (it should be 80% as long as) the same bitstream encoded as hex. A 40-bit field would consume 8 octets in base32, but 10 octets in hex. i would really like us to make a clear recommendation for a common textual interchange format for these identifiers; i'm not convinced that it's actually out-of-scope for 4880bis. --dkg
- [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint schemes Bryan Ford
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Bryan Ford
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Bryan Ford
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Hilarie Orman
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Robert J. Hansen
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… brian m. carlson
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Bryan Ford
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Bryan Ford
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Bryan Ford
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Vincent Breitmoser
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Vincent Breitmoser
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] Mining protection in fingerprint sc… Phillip Hallam-Baker