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Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requirement

"Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org> Mon, 05 December 2022 07:48 UTC

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Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2022 08:48:39 +0100
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From: "Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org>
To: Aron Wussler <aron@wussler.it>
Cc: Paul Schaub <vanitasvitae@riseup.net>, openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requirement
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On Sun, 04 Dec 2022 23:13:35 +0100,
Aron Wussler wrote:
> > Did you consider using an offline primary that tsigns the intermediate
> > keys?
> 
> Doesn't this require users to download both keys? It would probably save us some effort with trusting the offline key, but they must be individually fetched, and AFAIK this would be a change with how OpenPGP-CA works. Not against this model, but in general I agree with Heiko that there is insufficient support from the verifying side here, to allow for a seamless UX like TLS (or even close to that).

How do you currently get the top-level CA certificate?  WKD?  If so,
you can store all of the certificates there.  And since they all use
the same email address, getting the top-level certificate gets all of
the intermediate certificates.

> > I suspect that having this discussion now will further delay the
> > crypto refresh (in addition to thinking that it is out of scope).
> 
> True. So in your opinion we should not specify here whether certification subkeys are acceptable behaviour?
> Or shall we standardize the "status quo": certification subkeys are not allowed?

I'm for leaving it as it is, for now.

Neal

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