[openpgp] On composing scrypt and openpgp s2k key stretching for symmetric encryption

Brian Gitonga Marete <marete@toshnix.com> Thu, 22 May 2014 13:48 UTC

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From: Brian Gitonga Marete <marete@toshnix.com>
Date: Thu, 22 May 2014 16:48:09 +0300
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Subject: [openpgp] On composing scrypt and openpgp s2k key stretching for symmetric encryption
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Hello all!

What would be the security effect of generating a 32 byte key from a
passphrase using scrypt and then using that as a "passphrase" for openpgp's
symmetric encryption (this 32 byte key will of course then be acted upon by
openpgp's s2k algorithm). Specifically, can one expect that this will make
brute-forcing a symmetric passphrase (theoretically or practically) harder?
(Given the same strong passhrase).

Please note that I am asking this from an application point of view and not
calling for the inclusion of scrypt into the openpgp standard.

Thanks!

Brian Gitonga Marete.