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Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives

Stephen Paul Weber <singpolyma@singpolyma.net> Mon, 16 March 2015 14:49 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 09:49:34 -0500
From: Stephen Paul Weber <singpolyma@singpolyma.net>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives
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>> - Asymmetric algorithms, generally: RSA-ES, DSA.
>
>Are you referring to Public Key Algorithms specifically here?  in
>particular, this table:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-9.1
>
>If so, RSA-ES (pubkey algorithm 1) is very widely used, even for keys
>that are only marked for one usage (signatures or encryption).  In fact,
>i don't think there are many RSA keys labeled RSA-E (algo 2) and RSA-S
>(algo 3) at all.  Why treat RSA-ES separately for deprecation?

In fact, aren't the RSA-E and RSA-S algorithms basically just historical 
/ mostly deprecated in favour of marking keys for a particular use?

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