Re: [openpgp] AEAD Chunk Size

"Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org> Sat, 30 March 2019 21:16 UTC

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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2019 22:16:46 +0100
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From: "Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Bart Butler <bartbutler@protonmail.com>, "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Justus Winter <justuswinter@gmail.com>, Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>, Jon Callas <joncallas=40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] AEAD Chunk Size
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Hi Ben,

Thanks for your note.

At Sat, 30 Mar 2019 10:04:38 -0500,
Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> I also have a use case for authentication of large chunks of data at rest:
> they allow me to use a cheap bulk storage service that provides
> (best-effort) replication and archiving but has poor physical security.  So
> I encrypt my data to myself and put it in storage, but when I get it  back
> I need to know that it's valid.  I can imagine at least one case where
> knowing exactly which chunk was corrupted would save effort; it may be a
> toy example but perhaps it is illustrative of a broader case.  Note that
> there are algorithms to compute pi to arbitrary precision, and even to
> compute the Nth digit thereof without coputing the previous digits.  If I
> need to have random-access inquiries into the value of pi, I could
> precompute using softare I trust and do this self-encryption thing, and
> when a chunk is bad I can recompute only that chunk and still trust that I
> only ever use values generated by my trusted implementation.

Just to be clear: when you say "large chunks of data at rest," you're
not arguing that large AEAD chunks are better, are you?  It seems to
me that if you use small chunks, at least in your example, you have
less work to do when you discover a corrupted chunk.

Thanks,

:) Neal