Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids.
Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> Tue, 18 August 2015 14:33 UTC
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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 07:32:56 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
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Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, IETF OpenPGP <openpgp@ietf.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, ianG <iang@iang.org>
Subject: Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids.
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On 8/16/15 at 8:47 AM, derek@ihtfp.com (Derek Atkins) wrote: >Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> writes: > >>I think in the IoT space, we will need to have signed software >>updates. I don't think there is much of an issue taking several >>seconds to verify an update signature, but these 8 bit processors seem >>like the right level of hardware for these IoT devices. > >Yes, signed software is definitely one use case. However, often on >these systems it's more than just authenticating a software update; >sometimes it might actually want to check the signature on every bootup >(to prevent an attack on the flash/firmware)! I hope we don't have to worry about attacks via physical access, so the only attacks available will be through the upgrade mechanism. We also need to worry about authentication and replay prevention for the instructions delivered to these devices through the internet. One can imagine an architecture with a controller with the power of a Raspberry Pi giving orders to dumber devices using authenticated symmetric crypto as a solution. That system would prevent my favorite "neat hack" attack, turning your neighbor's living room into your own light organ. >I'll note that there are alternate algorithms that run much faster than >ECC (e.g. Algebraic Eraser can run in the tens of miliseconds instead of >the ones of seconds of ECC)! However my real point is that we should >not ignore these platforms, and more specifically we should remember >that they might not have the power to run the same algorithms that work >fine on our x86-64 servers. I think we are in violent agreement here. Cheers - Bill --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | If you want total security, go to prison. There you're 408-356-8506 | fed, clothed, given medical care and so on. The only www.pwpconsult.com | thing lacking is freedom. - Dwight D. Eisenhower
- [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Paul Wouters
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Christoph Anton Mitterer
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Christoph Anton Mitterer
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Stephen Farrell
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Paul Wouters
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [openpgp] Why or why not SHA{2,3}-512 (was: SHA3 … Werner Koch
- [openpgp] WWhy or why not SHA{2,3}-512 (was: SHA3… Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Peter Gutmann
- [openpgp] SHA-x performance (was: SHA3 algorithm … Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance (was: SHA3 algori… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance (was: SHA3 algori… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance (was: SHA3 algori… Dang, Quynh
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] Why or why not SHA{2, 3}-512 (was: … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] Why or why not SHA{2, 3}-512 Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Bill Frantz
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Hilarie Orman
- Re: [openpgp] WWhy or why not SHA{2, 3}-512 (was:… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance NIIBE Yutaka
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] SHA-x performance Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Bill Frantz
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Bill Frantz
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. ianG
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Robert J. Hansen
- Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids. Werner Koch