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Re: [openpgp] Must-Implement Algorithms (was:Summary of WG status)

"brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Fri, 14 July 2017 00:21 UTC

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Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 00:20:56 +0000
From: "brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
To: openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Must-Implement Algorithms (was:Summary of WG status)
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On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 09:47:00AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 13 Jul 2017 00:38, sandals@crustytoothpaste.net said:
> 
> > 3DES is still the must-implement encryption algorithm.  AES128 seems
> > like the logical choice here, since it's already MTI because of ECDH.
> 
> I am fine with that choice.
> 
> There is also the suggestion to make AES-nnn mandatory and 3DES optional
> when used with v5 keys.  I would be in favor of that; I don't care on
> whether this is AES-128 or AES-256.

I think that's a good idea.  AES-128 seems like the obvious choice to
make MTI because of ECDH, and I anticipate almost all implementations
will support AES-256 as well.

> > I suggest that we make the AEAD mode, whatever we pick, mandatory as
> > well.
> 
> We can only do that when used with v5 keys.  We can't do that in
> general.

Mandatory to implement, yes.  Mandatory to use, no.  We also have to
consider that someone might encrypt data to both v4 and v5 keys, in
which case they might have to fall back down to MDC.  We probably need a
feature flag for AEAD packets like we have with MDC.
-- 
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
https://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: https://keybase.io/bk2204

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