[openpgp] Forward-compatibility of existing implementations
Justus Winter <justus@sequoia-pgp.org> Tue, 06 June 2023 17:04 UTC
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From: Justus Winter <justus@sequoia-pgp.org>
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Date: Tue, 06 Jun 2023 19:04:36 +0200
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Subject: [openpgp] Forward-compatibility of existing implementations
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Moin :) as existing implementations are about to encounter post-RFC4880 artifacts, it is important to make them gracefully ignore those artifacts. For example, a message may be encrypted to both an RFC4880 recipient and a post-RFC4880 recipient, and it may be signed with a signature packet version >4. Similarly, known packet versions may use unknown public key and hash algorithms. The test suite contains a number of tests that look for such problems. I have tagged them "forward-compat": https://tests.sequoia-pgp.org/?q=forward-compat The following implementations have at least one issue: - GnuPG - GopenPGP - OpenPGP.js - PGPainless - PGPy - RNP Now is the time to fix them before they encounter post-RFC4880 artifacts in the wild and cause problems for users! Best, Justus
- [openpgp] Forward-compatibility of existing imple… Justus Winter