Re: [openpgp] "SHA-1 is a Shambles" and forging PGP WoT signatures

Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Wed, 22 January 2020 21:19 UTC

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From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: Marcus Brinkmann <marcus.brinkmann=40rub.de@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: openpgp@ietf.org
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Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 22:18:41 +0100
In-Reply-To: <d8321b24-8836-2702-6b01-242b4cab932f@rub.de> (Marcus Brinkmann's message of "Wed, 22 Jan 2020 15:31:26 +0100")
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] "SHA-1 is a Shambles" and forging PGP WoT signatures
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* Marcus Brinkmann:

> * Do not sign photo ids.  In fact, photo ids are problematic in many
> other ways and should be deprecated and not be used anymore. Support for
> user attribute packets should be dropped from the standard.

I expect that a similar attack would work involving non-critical
hashed subpackets in the private area.  They should provide enough
wiggle room.

> * The authors could have easily created colliding public keys with
> identical (160 bit SHA-1) fingerprints, at the cost of 45k USD.
> Although I don't know about any attack made possible by owning such a
> pair of keys, the pure existence of a fingerprint collision could cause
> problems in some appliations, triggering potential bugs in code that
> assumes fingerprints can never be identical.

It would definitely be nice to have such colliding keys for testing
purposes.